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THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT DEALS WITH THE 
ABANDONED MINERALS ACT  
WILLIAM P. PEARCE* 
ABSTRACT 
 
A tract of land containing subsurface mineral interests may be 
visualized as two separate parts: (1) the surface of the land and (2) the 
underlying mineral interest.  It is quite common in western North Dakota, 
for the ownership of the two parts of the tract to have been, at some earlier 
time, separated by a severance of the mineral interest from the surface, as 
the result of a sale, inheritance, or other form of transfer of real property 
interests.  North Dakota is only one of a number of states that have created 
some form of statutory process dealing with what are commonly referred to 
as “abandoned” or “dormant” mineral interests.  This is a process by which 
an owner of the surface of a tract is able to acquire a severed mineral 
interest, so as to reconnect it with the surface.  The general theory behind 
this concept is that a mineral interest which has not been “used” for a 
specific unbroken period of years has, in effect, been abandoned by the 
mineral owner, so that it may be available for rejoinder with the surface.   
Whether a surface owner can acquire the mineral interest depends on 
whether the interest has been “used,” at any time within a specified prior 
unbroken period of years.  The nature of such “use” is specifically set out in 
the statutes in question.  The surface owner is required to give notice to the 
mineral owner of an intention to invoke the process.  The mineral owner, of 
course, is given an opportunity to respond and show that the interest has in 
fact been used and thus has not been abandoned.  The 1983 North Dakota 
Abandoned Minerals Act, as amended, has come before the North Dakota 
Supreme Court on a number of occasions, dealing primarily with the 
notification issue.  The principal purpose of this Article is to examine the 
North Dakota Supreme Court’s analysis of the issues in these cases. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The ramifications of split ownership between the surface of lands in 
North Dakota and the possible existence of underlying mineral deposits, in 
particular oil and gas, have woven an interesting tapestry of legal principles 
over the years.  This began in 1951, when oil first flowed out of the ground 
from the Clarence Iverson #1 Well, completed as the first producing oil 
well in North Dakota on April 14, 1951.1  This, of course, set the stage for a 
new legal framework specifically built upon the need to answer the question 
of who owns the oil and gas, as well as other minerals.  The status of the 
ownership of a mineral interest, which has not been “used” for a period of 
twenty years, is the subject of the 1983 North Dakota “Termination of 
Mineral Interest Act” (sometimes referred to as the North Dakota 
Abandoned Minerals Act).  This Act allows for a possible change in 
ownership, as discussed in this Article.  In the discussion below, this Article 
will use “the Act” to refer to the North Dakota “Termination of Mineral 
Interest” legislation. 
At the outset, it is useful to explore briefly what exactly is meant when 
talking about the “ownership” of a mineral interest, and the broader 
question of the basic legal origin of the concept of “ownership.”  These are 
concepts which we all use daily as a matter of course, and we take it for 
granted that we understand what we mean by this language.  However, it is 
interesting to take a brief look behind the terminology to see what 
“ownership” really means. 
A. WHAT CONSTITUTES OWNERSHIP? 
The separation, or “severance,” of the mineral interest from the surface 
interest creates a situation in which at least two persons share in the 
ownership of the land.  In this situation, “land” is defined to mean the 
surface and everything underlying the surface.2  It is often said that when a 
severance of the mineral estate, that is the minerals beneath the surface, has 
                                                        
1. Circular No. 204, N.D. GEOLOGICAL SURV., (N.D. Indus. Comm’n Dep’t of Mineral Res., 
Bismarck, N.D.) June 1958, at 1. 
2. There may be a question, of course, as to how the “surface” is defined in the context of 
hard minerals, such as lignite coal, that are mined by strip mining techniques, but for purposes of 
the discussion in this article, this question need not be addressed. North Dakota law does describe 
“subsurface minerals” as all naturally occurring elements and their compounds, volcanic ash, 
precious metals, carbonates, and natural mineral salts of boron, bromine, calcium, fluorine, iodine, 
lithium, magnesium, phosphorus, potassium, sodium, thorium, uranium, and sulfur, and their 
compounds but does not include sand and gravel and rocks crushed for sand and gravel. N.D. 
CENT. CODE. § 38-15-02 (2015). 
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taken place, the surface owner and the owner of the severed mineral interest 
each has a separate and distinct property right or estate in the land.3  Simply 
stating that a person has a “property right” in, or “owns,” the severed 
mineral interest, however, does not explain the nature of the ownership.  
That question can be clarified only by looking behind the descriptive words 
“property” and ‘ownership:” 
 
In the first place, it is necessary to distinguish between the right of 
ownership itself and the subject-matter of that right . . . It is 
necessary to realize, however, that although “property” is often 
used in this loose way to refer either to the thing itself or to the 
rights in that thing, the concept of ownership itself is quite distinct 
from any tangible things to which it may relate, for it is no more 
than the expression of a legal relationship resulting from a set of 
legal norms . . . For this purpose it may be said that ownership is 
not a single category of legal “right” but is a complex bundle of 
rights whose precise character will vary from legal system to legal 
system.4 
 
 The legal concept of “property” or “ownership of property,” therefore, 
does not represent a thing itself but rather certain rights.  These rights are 
not between the owner and some object of ownership, but are rights 
between the owner and other persons with respect to that object.5  This 
concept of the enjoyment by one person (the “owner”) of a certain bundle 
of rights in a thing, such as land, which are enforceable by the sanctions of 
the law against other persons, is at the heart of the traditional common law 
theory of private property.6  As a general principle, the essence of private 
                                                        
3. E.g., McDonald v. Antelope Land & Cattle Co., 294 N.W.2d 391, 396 (ND 1980)(“In 
North Dakota, after a mineral title is severed by reservation, the surface and minerals are held by 
separate and distinct titles, and each is a freehold estate of inheritance. The result is the same 
whether the severance is accomplished by reservation of minerals in a deed or by a deed 
conveying a mineral interest.”); See generally Beulah Coal Mining Co. v. Heihn, 46 N.D. 646, 
180 N.W. 787 (1920). 
4. DENNIS LLOYD, THE IDEA OF LAW 319, 323 (1964). 
5. MORRIS R. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 45 (1933) (“A right is always against 
one or more individuals.”). 
6. See OLIVER W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 169, 193 (1963). Holmes defined a legal 
right as follows: 
A legal right is nothing but a permission to exercise certain natural powers, and upon 
certain conditions to obtain protection, restitution, or compensation by the aid of the 
public force. Just so far as the aid of the public force is given to a man, he has a legal 
right . . . But what are the rights of ownership? . . . Within the limits proscribed by 
policy, the owner is allowed to exercise his natural powers over the subject matter 
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property is the right of the owner to exclude others from exercising power 
or control over, or enjoying the fruits of, some object or thing, subject to 
appropriate governmental restrictions.7 
B. SOURCE OF OWNERSHIP 
Having established the general nature of ownership of a mineral 
interest, whether severed from the surface or remaining joined with the 
surface, the next question is where does ownership derive from?  Generally 
speaking, ownership of land in most legal systems derives from the 
sovereign, who is perceived to own all of the land, including underlying 
minerals, in the country before any of it has been granted to other entities or 
persons.8  In England, this meant the King.9  In the United States, it meant 
that the United States itself owned all of the land in the country, or as we 
often say had “title” to the land.10  Passage of “title,” reflects the passage of 
ownership from a prior owner to a new owner.11  On the surface, it sounds 
like a simple system.  The sovereign, whoever this may be – the King, the 
government of a republic like the United States, the Emperor, etc. – has 
ownership (title).  The sovereign then grants that title to someone else by 
some kind of more or less official document, which may be called a charter, 
patent, deed, or some other kind of instrument.  In practice, when the 
United States was first coming into being, it was not so simple, since the 
concept of title itself was sometimes murky: 
 
                                                        
uninterfered with, and is more or less protected in excluding other people from such 
interference. The owner is allowed to exclude and is accountable to no one. 
7. COHEN, supra note 5, at 57 (“To be really effective, therefore, the right of property must 
be supported by restrictions or positive duties on the part of owners, enforced by the state, as 
much as by the right to exclude others that is the essence of property.”). 
8. WILLIAM F. WALSH, A HISTORY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 184 (2d ed. 1932) (“Land 
has always included trees and other natural growth thereon, the soil and minerals below the 
surface.”). 
9. ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 77 (1963) (“The king was ultimate 
lord of the soil and also the fountain of justice.”); Lawrence M. Friedman, A HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN LAW 52 (1973) (“[Land] was parceled out in the Middle Ages in tiers of estates, with 
the king at the apex . . . .”). Before the American Revolution and the formation of the United 
States, of course, the king of England owned the land constituting the American colonies, prior to 
the grant by him of ownership in some form to others, for example William Penn. Penn received a 
royal charter from King Charles II in 1681 to cover a debt of £16,000 owed by the monarch to 
Penn’s father Admiral William Penn. Under this royal charter, Penn became the “proprietor,” that 
is the owner, of a huge tract of land in what is now Pennsylvania. HANS FANTEL, WILLIAM PENN: 
APOSTLE OF DISSENT 147-48 (1974). 
10. WALSH, supra note 8, at 171. 
11. Title, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968) (“Title is the means whereby the owner 
of lands has the just possession of his property.”). 
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There were chronic difficulties in determining title. Government 
surveys, for all their defects, made it possible to identify the 
physical aspects of the land. But title is a concept more elusive 
than longitude, more nebulous than a tree stump or a stream. Title 
became as vexatious and intractable a subject as the abolished law 
of tenure. Sometimes title depended upon the terms of some vast, 
ambiguous grant – from the federal government, or the King of 
Spain, or a dead proprietor. Or it had to take into account the 
patents (grants) of American state governments, possibly 
equivocal, possibly corrupt.12 
 
The author of this quotation was referring to the medieval system of land 
“tenure,” prevalent in England after the Norman Conquest.  The actual 
ownership of the land was in the sovereign, who would make a grant to a 
“vassal.”13  A vassal is an aristocrat – a baron or other knight – who 
exercised control over his own group of fighting men and retainers.14  The 
vassal “owned” the land in most senses, in that he could restrict others from 
trespassing upon it, and he enjoyed the fruits of the land.15  However, 
ultimate ownership remained in the sovereign, who could reclaim it, for 
example, if the vassal broke his sworn oath to serve the sovereign and to 
come to his aid in times of war (which of course was a frequent 
occurrence).16  The relationship between sovereign and vassal became fairly 
                                                        
12. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 212 (1973). 
13. DAVID C. DOUGLAS, WILLIAM THE CONQUEROR, THE NORMAN IMPACT UPON 
ENGLAND 268-74 (1964).  
14. Vassal, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1723 (3d ed. 1968) (A vassal is “the holder of a fief 
on a feudal tenure, and by the obligation of performing feudal services. The correlative term was 
‘lord.’ The vassal himself might be lord of some other vassal.”); see also J.C. HOLT, MAGNA 
CARTA 43 (1969) (Referring to royal patronage: “Kings could not restrict it to their immediate 
followers. All their tenants-in-chief were their immediate vassals with a claim upon the royal 
favour and expectation of reward.”); WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, MAGNA CARTA: LEGEND AND 
LEGACY 12 (1965) (“The crown tenants, or tenants in chief, held their estates of the king; and by 
subinfeudation these barons required homage of mesne lords who held of them.”). 
15. WALSH, supra note 8, at 100. 
16. NORMAN F. CANTOR, MEDIEVAL HISTORY: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF A CIVILIZATION 
218 (2nd ed. 1969) stating:  
The granting of a fief [right in land] did not involve the giving of complete property 
rights over the estate to the vassal. He had the use of the income of the land as a 
reward for service and in order to make possible his outfitting as a knight. But 
technically the ultimate ownership of the land was still the lord’s, who could recover if 
the vassal ceased to be loyal, and when the vassal died the fief automatically reverted 
to the lord. 
See also WALSH, supra note 8, at 36 stating:  
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complex.  In fact, one of the goals underlying the Magna Carta of 1215 was 
to define and regulate some of the mutual duties and responsibilities 
between them.17 
II. SEVERANCE OF A MINERAL INTEREST FROM THE SURFACE 
INTEREST 
A. SEPARATION OF INTERESTS 
The “ownership” of the surface or of an underlying mineral interest, 
depends on the rights held by the owner of each one vis-à-vis the other.18  
Prior to any development of a mineral interest, the interest remains 
connected with, or perhaps related to, the surface interest in the land.19  
Fluid minerals, like oil and gas, are not fixed to the ground.  The law has 
long recognized the Rule of Capture and the modifications of that rule with 
modern spacing and pooling regulations.20  It is clearly no longer possible 
for the owner of oil and gas in a tract to get under the tract and suck out as 
much of the oil and gas as possible from adjacent tracts in addition to his 
own and then claim that ownership of everything thus “captured” in this 
manner belongs to him.  
In many instances in western North Dakota over the years, as in many 
other states, the surface interest and the underlying mineral interest in tracts 
of land had become separated by deeds or reservations of mineral interest 
apart from the surface.  The grantor in a mineral deed or the grantor of a 
surface tract who reserves or excepts the mineral interest from the grant 
holds a separate fee simple estate in the minerals in place, with all the of the 
                                                        
The thegn [knight] owed military service depending in amount on the number of hides 
[about 120 aces each] of land held by him . . . The land did not owe this service; it was 
due from the thegn or ordinary freeholder to the king as lord of the nation; but it was 
regulated and determined on the basis of land ownership. 
17. J. C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 207 (1965). 
18. LLOYD, supra note 4, at 322-23. 
19. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-01 (West 2017) (A severed mineral interest is any 
interest in minerals owned by a person other than the owner of the surface estate.). 
20. Under the classic Rule of Capture, oil and gas were perceived to be “fugacious,” that is 
freely flowing underground, and the mineral owner in a tract of land was entitled to anything he 
could produce by drilling on the tract he owned. See Cont’l Res., Inc. v. Farrar Oil Co., 1997 ND 
31, 559 N.W.2d 841 (“It was thought that oil, like water, flowed in underground streams, and the 
law analogized the ownership of oil to the ownership of water and wild animals that could be 
captured when they crossed one’s property.”). The draining of oil and gas from adjacent tracts 
owned by others was a necessary consequence but one which could theoretically be prevented by 
the drilling of “offset” wells. The original term of Rule of Capture derives from English common 
law and was applicable to water and animals as well. Id. In a basic sense, the concept was that 
whatever a person could take without invading or coming on the land of another person he was 
entitled to keep as his own. 
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legally protected rights available to an owner of real property.21  The goal 
of the abandoned minerals legislation in North Dakota and other states has 
been to reattach the surface and minerals in a tract if it has been determined 
that the mineral interest is no longer being “used” in any of a number of 
ways set out in the statutes.22  In this way, an “unused” mineral interest can 
revert to and become connected to the overlying surface where there has 
been a separation in the past.23  This in turn necessarily means the surface 
owner has now become the owner of both the surface and the underlying 
mineral interest.24  The fundamental underlying basis for this concept is that 
when a mineral interest owner has neglected to do anything with his interest 
for twenty years or more, he has in effect shown that he has no actual 
interest.25  Accordingly, the owner is deemed to have abandoned the 
mineral interest.26  At first blush, the twenty-year period may perhaps seem 
excessive when compared, for example, to the three-year period after which 
unclaimed sums payable as mineral proceeds are deemed abandoned.27  The 
differences are substantial, however, not the least of which is that we are 
dealing with real property rather than personal property and the 
circumstances are very different. 
 
                                                        
21. Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543, 550 (N.D. 1973). 
22. The general thinking behind the abandoned minerals acts, at least to some extent, is that 
reuniting severed minerals with the overlying surface will stimulate economic development by 
promoting mineral exploration and development. See Phillip E. Norvell, Dormancy Mineral 
Legislation: A Cure for the Malady or Another Affliction?, 16 E. MIN L. INST. ch. 12, 432-33 
(1977) stating that:  
Highly fractionalized ownership of severed mineral titles is endemic to areas where 
coal, oil and gas production and exploration are prevalent. The geometric increase in 
ownership of a severed mineral interest that occurs with each passing generation by 
testate and intestate succession, resulting in greater fractional ownership, i.e., more 
owners of diminished fractional interests, impedes the development of coal, oil and 
gas prospects . . . Dormancy mineral legislation is the modern solution to the problems 
associated with severed mineral titles of ancient origin. 
See also KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 119 (1989) 
(“Antebellum [i.e. pre-Civil War] judges treated property as a dynamic commodity to be 
employed for productive uses deemed in the interest of the public . . . The judicial formulation of 
the common law of property hastened economic growth in the name of the public good.”).  
23. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-02 (West 2017) (“Title to the abandoned mineral 
interest vests in the owner or owners of the surface estate in the land in or under which the mineral 
interest is located on the date of abandonment.”). 
24. See id. 
25. See id. 
26. NAT. CONF. L. COMM’RS, UNIF. DORMANT MINERAL INTERESTS ACT 2 (1986), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/dormant%20mineral%20interests/udmia_final_86.pdf 
(changed to Model Act 1999).  
27. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 47-30.1-16.1(1) (West 2017). 
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B. SO-CALLED ABANDONED MINERALS ARE NOT REALLY LEGALLY 
ABANDONED 
The characterization of statutes in various states which have addressed 
this issue as “abandoned minerals” acts is frankly a poor choice because it 
is contrary to the legal meaning of “abandoned.”  To abandon property, 
under established common law principles, meant for the owner to perform 
some decisive act of leaving it, and to demonstrate by specific evidence of 
an intention to dispense with it.28  The intention to abandon is the critical 
element.29  Under the old common law tradition, two things must occur in 
order for property to have been abandoned, as stated above: (1) an act by 
the owner that clearly shows that he or she has given up rights to the 
property; and (2) an intention that demonstrates that the owner has 
knowingly relinquished control over it.30  In fact, the general traditional 
common law rule was that real property cannot be abandoned: 
 
Most starkly, the common law flatly prohibits the legal 
abandonment of the fee simple interest in land. A landowner who 
wants to sever his ties to the land must find a willing recipient of 
title, someone to whom he can either sell or give the parcel.31 
 
The North Dakota Act, does not in any respect fall into the traditional 
definition of “abandonment,” but this term has clearly acquired a new 
meaning in the context of so-called “abandoned mineral interests.”  
                                                        
28. Patrick J. Garver & Patricia J. Winmill, Medicine for Ailing Mineral Titles: An 
Assessment of the Impact of Adverse Possession, Statutes of Limitation, and Dormant Mineral 
Acts, 29 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. Inst. 281 (1983). 
29. Abandonment, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968) defining abandonment as:  
‘Abandonment’ includes both the intention to abandon and the external act by which 
the intention is carried into effect. In determining whether one has abandoned his 
property or rights, the intention is the first and paramount object of inquiry, for there 
can be no abandonment without the intention to abandon.  
See also 1 W. BLAKE ODGERS & WALTER BLAKE ODGERS, JR., THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 
19 (10th ed. 1911). See also, Johnson v. Mark, 2013 ND 128, ¶ 22, 834 N.W.2d 291, 298 
(“Abandonment of property necessarily involves an act by which the possession is relinquished.”) 
(quoting Barnes v. Hulet, 34 N.D. 576, 159 N.W. 25, 29 (1916)). 
30. Timothy C. Dowd, Oil and Gas Title Law -  A Review of Fifty Common Problems –North 
Dakota, 90 N.D. L. REV. 289, 304 (2014); see Lost, Mislaid, and Abandoned Property, 8 
FORDHAM L. REV. 222, 235 (1939); City of Anson v. Arnett, 250 S.W.2d 450, 454 (Tex. App. 
1952) (“An essential element of abandonment is the intention to abandon and such intention must 
be shown by clear and satisfactory evidence. Abandonment may be shown by circumstances but 
the circumstances must disclose some definite act showing intention to abandon.”). 
31. Eduardo M. Penalver, The Illusory Right to Abandon, 109 MICH. L. REV. 191, 200 
(2010). 
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Presumably, the North Dakota Legislature would take the position that its 
adoption of the term “abandoned” in the context of this statute is an 
example of the rule that “[i]n this state there is no common law in any case 
in which the law is declared by the code.”32  The North Dakota Century 
Code, however, does not define or describe the term “abandoned.” 
C. THERE IS NO TERMINATION OF MINERAL INTERESTS UNDER THE 
ACT 
As mentioned above, the 1983 North Dakota “Abandoned Minerals 
Act” was originally described as an act for the “Termination of Mineral 
Interest.”33  This was a curious use of the word “termination,” since the 
statute does not apply to termination of mineral interests in any sense.  It is 
not exactly clear why North Dakota adopted the label “Termination of 
Mineral Interest”34 to describe its “abandonment of mineral interests” 
statute, but that description is even less appropriate than referring to 
“abandonment.”  It covers only the change of ownership of mineral interests 
which have been shown not to have been “used” for an unbroken period of 
twenty years.35  A mineral interest continues to exist, regardless of the fact 
that ownership of the interest may have been changed, through the 
operation of the law, by a reversion of ownership to the surface owner.  It is 
interesting to remember that “terminate” means to destroy or end whatever 
is being terminated, but the North Dakota statute in question does not in any 
manner seek to terminate the mineral interest.  Quite to the contrary, the 
point in fact is the opposite:  to maintain the mineral interest in effect after 
twenty years or more of nonuse.  The mineral interest will pass into 
different hands if the surface owner is successful in acquiring it, but it 
certainly does not cease to exist.  Ownership by the mineral owner is, of 
course, terminated when ownership of the mineral interest passes to the 
surface owner, but the mineral interest itself definitely is not terminated.  In 
the body of the North Dakota statute, the terms “abandoned mineral 
interest” and “abandonment” are used and “termination” does not occur.36  
                                                        
32. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 1-01-06 (West 2017). This statute is indicative of the overall 
gradual change in American law from reliance on the English common law to newly-created 
statutory law. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, 
at 7 (1977) (“In short, common law doctrines were derived from natural principles of justice, 
statutes were acts of will; common law rules were discovered, statutes were made.”). 
33. 1983 N.D. Laws 1283. 
34. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. ch. 38-18.1 (West 2017). 
35. Id. § 38-18.1-02.  
36. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-02 (West 2017). 
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In any case, the preferable term would be “dormant mineral interests,” as is 
the case in some other states, rather than “abandoned” or “terminated” 
mineral interests.  It is interesting, however, that even the Model Act 
discussed below uses the word “termination” at one point. 
III. BACKGROUND OF SEPARATE OWNERSHIP OF SURFACE AND 
MINERALS 
This idea of separate ownership of the surface and the underlying 
mineral interest is a fairly modern concept.  The English common law 
tradition contemplated that “ownership of land” included ownership of the 
surface and everything under and above it.37  An exception was made for 
ownership of precious metals such as gold and silver, which belonged to the 
sovereign, who could be said to have reserved those mineral substances in 
any grant of rights in land to private persons.38  American law, however, 
never recognized any inherent, or automatic, ownership of any severed 
minerals by the government in private lands.39  Beginning in the nineteenth 
century, grants of land to individuals or to corporations, such as the 
railroads, from the vast domain of public lands in this country, did not even 
attempt to sever or reserve minerals in these public lands.40 
Early in the twentieth century, it was apparent that coal, oil and gas, 
and other minerals constituted a potentially enormous source of public 
wealth.41  Accordingly, mineral reservations became customary, and 
                                                        
37. This is reflected in the grand old Latin legal maxim: Cuius est solum, eius est usque ad 
coelum et ad inferos (“Whoever owns the soil, owns from the center of the earth to the sky.”). 
Shell Oil Co. v. Manley Oil Corp., 37 F. Supp. 289, 292 (D. Ill. 1941). The notion of owning to 
the sky above the surface has of course been greatly limited in modern times, or else airplanes and 
weather satellites would be constantly trespassing. 
38. See A. Lucas, Freehold Ownership of Oil and Gas in Introduction to Oil and Gas Law 23 
(1983), citing as an example the 1670 grant by the King of England of approximately one billion 
acres of land in the basin of Hudson’s Bay in Canada, comprising nearly one-half of Canada, 
covering everything from the surface to the center of the Earth, except reserving gold, silver, gems 
and precious stones that might be discovered. 
39. A governmental entity may, of course, expressly reserve mineral rights in a grant of land, 
or acquire severed mineral interests from a private owner. See, e.g., infra note 41 (referencing the 
reservation of minerals in patents issued by the United States). North Dakota began, in 1939, to 
reserve a portion of the minerals in conveyances of its so-called “school lands,” that is the lands 
acquired from the federal government upon statehood, and now it is required by the state 
constitution that 100% of the mineral interests in a sale of state land must be reserved. See N.D. 
CONST. art. IX, § 5. 
40. See generally Thomas E. Root, Railroad Land Grants from Canals to Transcontinentals,  
1987 A.B.A. SEC. NAT. RES. L. (containing a detailed history of federal land grants to railroads 
and showing that mineral reservations only became standard in the latter part of the 1800’s). 
41. See 30 U.S.C. § 81 (1909) (reserving coal to the United States in any land patent) and 43 
U.S.C. § 299(a) (1916) (reserving all minerals to the United States in any land patent).              
This legislation clearly demonstrated that the United States had, by the early 1900’s, begun to 
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eventually mandatory, in many types of grants and other dispositions of 
public lands, particularly in the western United States.42  As the practices of 
reserving minerals in private land transfers and separately transferring 
mineral interests gained favor, severed ownership of the surface and the 
underlying mineral interest in land became common.43  North Dakota is 
typical of many western states in having widespread ownership of severed 
mineral interests, both private and governmental.44 
One might raise a question whether the mineral interest and the surface 
are necessarily conceptually separate and different entities.  In the context 
of surface mining of hard minerals like coal, it may be difficult as a 
practical matter to fully distinguish the mineral estate from the surface 
estate.  In the case of oil and gas, however, it is clear that the surface and 
the underlying oil and gas occupy quite separate zones and there is no 
difficulty in distinguishing them.  For example, the Clarence Iverson #1 Oil 
Well mentioned above was drilled to a total subsurface depth of 11,955 feet 
in what is referred to as the Madison Formation.45  In any case, the courts 
have made it clear that the mineral interest and the surface interest are two 
separate and distinct legal interests.46  In its early decision in Beulah Coal 
Mining Co. v. Heihn,47 involving a conveyance of land with a reservation of 
                                                        
recognize the importance of this wealth of mineral interests, particularly in western states where 
large land grants were made to assist railroads to reach to the west coast. See id. 
42. See id.  Reservation of coal in a federal patent, for example, became mandatory under 
several federal statutes, starting in 1909, and finally under a 1916 federal statute all minerals were 
included in the mandatory reservation.  
43. ELWYN B. ROBINSON, HISTORY OF NORTH DAKOTA 458-59 (Univ. Neb. Press 1966) 
(“The discovery of oil on April 4, 1951, brought another revolution [following a highway 
construction revolution] in North Dakota life . . . The discovery set off an exciting boom.”). 
Review of North Dakota county deed records shows that, beginning as early as the late 1930’s and 
early 1940’s, mineral deeds and deeds containing mineral reservations began to appear, but the 
numbers greatly increased especially after the discovery of oil in the Iverson well. See supra note 
1. 
44. See supra note 1. After the 1951 discovery of oil in Williams County, North Dakota, 
mineral deeds or deeds containing mineral reservations began to multiply quickly in the county 
records offices. In addition to the many private mineral interests, the State of North Dakota owns 
substantial amounts of mineral interests arising from minerals located in the lands gifted to the 
state by the United States, consisting of two sections in every township (primarily Sections 16 and 
36 in each township) in 1889 when North Dakota became a state. In addition, the state owns the 
riverbeds, including any underlying minerals in all rivers which were navigable at statehood, the 
largest of which is the Missouri River in the western part of the state. See Hogue v. Bourgois, 71 
N.W.2d 47 (N.D. 1955). 
45. See N.D. Geological Surv. Circular, supra note 1. 
46. See e.g., Bilby v. Wire, 77 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 1956); Nw. Improvement Co. v. Norris, 74 
N.W.2d 497 (N.D. 1955). 
47. 180 N.W. 787 (N.D. 1920). 
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coal made by the grantor, the North Dakota Supreme Court made it clear 
that the mineral interest is a separate interest in real property, the ownership 
of which may validly be severed from the ownership of the surface.48  The 
severance of a mineral interest may, of course, be accomplished by a 
mineral deed, separate from the surface, just as by a reservation or 
exception in a deed conveying the surface.  In early judicial analyses, a 
reservation of minerals in a deed was sometimes conceptually treated as a 
conveyance of the reserved minerals back to the grantor by the grantee.49  
Referred to as the “grant back” theory, this has been characterized in 
modern times as resorting to unnecessary “hypertechnical legal 
reasoning.”50  The acts of reserving a mineral interest from a conveyance of 
land or excepting the mineral interest from the conveyance are functionally 
identical.51  
IV. THE 1983 NORTH DAKOTA ACT AND ITS EVOLUTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
The original North Dakota statute pertaining to “abandoned” mineral 
interests was enacted in 1983.52  Although the legislative bill, which 
became the statute, was labelled “Abandoned Mineral Rights,” the first line 
of the actual text of the bill established the name by which it became listed 
in the North Dakota Century Code, as noted above: 
 
An Act to provide for the termination of mineral interest 
[emphasis added] in land owned by persons other than the owners 
of the surface and for the vesting of title to dormant mineral 
interests in the surface owners in the absence of appropriate 
                                                        
48. Heihn, 180 N.W. at 789 stating:  
Minerals in place are land, and may be conveyed as other lands are conveyed . . . 
Contracts excepting ores and mineral from grants of land, with a reservation of the 
right to enter upon the portion thereof granted are in accordance with long-established 
usage and have been invariably held by the courts to be valid, and not to be contrary 
to, but in harmony with, public policy. 
49. See Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543 (N.D. 1973). 
50. Reiss v. Rummel, 232 N.W.2d 40, 47 (N.D. 1975). 
51. Christman v. Emineth, 212 N.W.2d 543, 552 (N.D. 1973) (“[A] reservation, like an 
exception, is something to be deducted from the thing granted, narrowing and limiting what would 
otherwise pass by the general words of the grant”). In some states, however, different 
consequences may attach to the use of one term or the other in certain situations. see, e.g., Coyne 
v. Butler, 396 S.W.2d 474 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). 
52. 1983 N.D. Laws 1283 (“Abandoned Mineral Rights Act”).  
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developmental activities or the recording of a notice of claim of 
interest within a specified period.53 
 
Already at this early stage there were three different characterizations 
of the legislation:  (1) mineral interests which had been abandoned, (2) 
mineral interests which had been terminated and (3) mineral interest which 
had become dormant.54  The goal was the same, however, regardless of how 
the method was described:  namely to somehow reconnect a previously 
severed mineral interest to the surface from which it had been originally 
severed, if it could be demonstrated that the mineral interest had not been 
“used” for an unbroken period of twenty years.55 
A substantial number of other states have enacted this kind of 
legislation, sometimes referred to as “dormant mineral” statutes.  Probably 
the best known judicial opinion on this topic derives from the federal 
constitutional challenge brought to the United States Supreme Court in 
Texaco, Inc. v. Short,56 which discussed the Indiana dormant mineral 
statute, which is similar to the North Dakota Act.57  A variety of arguments 
were presented to the Court in the Texaco case, alleging the statute violated 
the United States Constitution, including taking of property without just 
compensation, a lack of state powers to enact the statute, violation of due 
process, and others.58  However, the Court held, in a lengthy 5-4 opinion, 
that the Indiana dormant mineral statute did not create any federal 
constitutional violations.59  The present Article discusses the cases that have 
gone to the North Dakota Supreme Court on issues under the North Dakota 
Act, but none of the decisions in these cases were based on either federal or 
state constitutional provisions. 
B. ORIGINAL PROVISIONS OF THE NORTH DAKOTA ACT 
The North Dakota Abandoned Mineral Act (or Termination of Mineral 
Interest Act) has now been in place for nearly thirty-five years and, as is 
                                                        
53. Id. 
54. Id.; see also N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. ch. 38-18.1 (West 2017) (“Termination of Mineral 
Interest”); Capps v. Weflen, 2013 ND 16, 826 N.W.2d 605 (“final resolution of the dormant 
mineral dispute”). 
55. Abandoned Mineral Rights Act, §§ 2-3. 
56. 454 U.S. 516 (1982). 
57. Id.  
58. Id. For a lucid and detailed analysis of the taking issue as presented in this case, see 
Joshua E. Teichman, Dormant Mineral Acts and Texaco, Inc. v. Short: Undermining the Taking 
Clause, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 157 (1982). 
59. Texaco, 454 U.S. at 516.  
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customary with wide-reaching legislation of this type, has undergone a 
number of changes since the 1983 enactment, some minor and others more 
significant.60  The basic statement of the function of the Act has remained 
unchanged: 
 
Any mineral interest shall, if unused for a period of twenty years, 
be deemed to be abandoned, unless a statement of claim is 
recorded in accordance with section 4 of this Act.  Title to the 
abandoned mineral interest shall vest in the owner of the surface 
estate in the land in or under which the mineral interest is located 
on the date of abandonment.61  This single sentence basically 
summarizes the process by which any mineral interest can be made 
to revert to the surface owner if there has been a twenty-year 
failure to use the interest.62 
 
The provisions of the 1983 Act were divided into eight separate 
sections.  The corresponding sections of the present North Dakota Century 
Code are listed below in brackets, which included two additional sections.  
 
Section 1: Mineral interest defined [N.D.C.C. § 38-18.1-01]. 
Section 2: Statement of claims – Recording – Reversion [N.D.C.C. 
§ 38-18.1-02]. 
Section 3: When Mineral interest deemed to be used [N.D.C.C. § 
38-18.1-03]. 
Section 4: Statement of Claim – Recording – Time [N.D.C.C. § 
38-18.1-04]. 
Section 5: Failure to record the statement of claim [N.D.C.C. § 38-
18.1-05]. 
                                                        
60. See Mineral Interest Termination Act 1989 N.D. Laws 1186; Register of Deeds Changed 
to Recorder Act, 2001 N.D. Laws ch. 120 § 1; Termination of Mineral Interests Act, 2005 N.D. 
Laws 1254; Abandoned Mineral Succession Statements Act, 2007 N.D. Laws 1220; Act of Apr. 
24, 2009, 2009 N.D. Laws ch. 317 § 1; Act of Mar. 19, 2015, 2015 N.D. Laws ch. 62 § 14(f). 
61. Compare 1983 N.D. Laws 1283 (“Abandoned Mineral Rights Act”) with N.D. CENT. 
CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-02 (West 2017). The Act of course does not apply to any mineral interest 
owned by a governmental entity. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-08 (2017). 
62. This does not happen, however, if the mineral owner has recorded a proper timely 
statement of claim, since in that case the mineral estate is deemed to have been used. N.D. CENT. 
CODE ANN. § 38-18.1.03(1)(f) (West 2017). 
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Section 6: Notice of lapse of mineral interest – Method. [N.D.C.C. 
§ 38-18.1-06]. 
Section 7: Waiver prohibited [N.D.C.C. § 38-18.1-07]. 
Section 8: Non-applicability to governmental bodies [N.D.C.C. § 
38-18.1-08].  
 
Sections 7 and 8 do not add to the substantive content of the Act, nor have 
they surfaced in any of the litigated cases.  Section 7 states that the 
provisions of the 1983 Act may not be waived at any time prior to the 
expiration of the twenty-year period.  Section 8 states the Act does not 
apply to any mineral interest owned by any governmental body or agency 
and that Act is both prospective and retrospective.  It does not appear to be 
necessary for these two sections to be discussed below.  
C. COMMENTS ON THE ORIGINAL 1983 PROVISIONS OF THE NORTH 
DAKOTA ACT 
This Article will provide comments on each of the relevant above-
mentioned sections.  As stated above, however, Section 7 and Section 8, do 
not appear to require any individual discussion. The important sections 
(Sections 1-6) contain all of the provisions required for the Act to be 
utilized. 
1. Section 1: Mineral interest defined: 
This section broadly defined “mineral interest” as an “interest in oil, 
gas, coal, clay, gravel, uranium and all other minerals of any kind and 
nature.”63  With a broad definition of this kind it cannot fail to include every 
possible mineral.64 Section 1 does provide that these substances are 
minerals “unless context or subject matter otherwise requires.” This is 
simply a precautionary statement, as it does not seem likely that such a 
context or subject is likely to arise. 
2.  Section 2: Statement of Claims – Recording – Reversion 
This section described the basic principle of the Act:  If any mineral 
interest is “unused” for a period of twenty years or more, it is deemed to be 
                                                        
63. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-01 (West 2017). 
64. There is a substantial body of North Dakota law, including court decisions and statutory 
provisions, establishing which substances are “minerals.” The definition above is sufficient for 
purposes of this Article. 
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abandoned unless a statement of claim, which is defined in Section 4, is 
recorded in the county where the interest is located. 65  If no statement of 
claim has been recorded, the abandoned mineral interest passes to the 
surface owner or owners as of the date of abandonment.66  Although “date 
of abandonment” is not separately defined, it may be taken for granted that 
“abandonment” in any particular case occurs immediately after the end of 
the twenty-year period. 
3. Section 3: When Mineral Interest Deemed to be Used 
This section is very important because it specifies under what activity 
or condition a mineral interest is deemed to have been “used.” 67  This is the 
core of the Act, since at least one of these activities must have occurred 
during the twenty-year period. If that is not the case, then the process for 
possibly having the mineral interest revert to the surface can take place. 
Any of the eight kinds of activities or scenarios would constitute “use” of a 
mineral interest, as follows: 
 
(a) If any minerals are produced under that interest. 
(b) If operations are being conducted on the tract for injection, 
withdrawal, storage, or disposal of water, gas or other fluid 
substances. 
(c) In the case of solid minerals there is production from a 
common vein or seam by the  mineral owner. 
(d) The mineral interest on the tract is subject to a lease, mortgage, 
assignment, and conveyance (this was amended in 1989 to “or 
conveyance”) recorded in the county in question. It must be taken 
for granted that this means such a document that has been recorded 
in the office of the county register of deeds (now county recorder) 
within the previous twenty years. 
(e) The mineral interest is subject to an order or agreement to pool 
or unitize recorded in the office of the county register of deeds 
(now county recorder). 
                                                        
65. Abandoned Mineral Rights Act § 2. 
66. Id. (“Title to the abandoned mineral interest shall vest in the owner or owners of the 
surface estate in the land in or under which the mineral estate is located on the date of 
abandonment.”). 
67. Id. § 3. 
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(f) Taxes are paid on the mineral interest by the mineral owner. 
(This presumably means real property taxes, which do not exist on 
mineral interests in North Dakota. This type of  “use” was removed 
from the statute, though not until 2015.).  
(g) A proper statement of claim is recorded, as specified in Section 
4 below. 
(h) The owner or lessee utilizes the mineral interest in a manner 
pursuant to, or  authorized by, the instrument creating the mineral 
interest.68 
 
These various kinds of activities or situations, for the most part, created 
reasonably plausible criteria for the purposes of the Act, except that (h) was 
a very strange circular and essentially meaningless definition in that it was 
effectively attempting to define “use” in terms of itself, by inserting the 
word “utilize.”  What the drafters might have had in mind is not clear, but 
in any case, (h) no longer exists in the present form of the statute, having 
been eliminated in a 2009 amendment.69 
It is interesting that the various definitions for “use” have not come 
before the Court at all.  The questions which the Court has dealt with are 
mostly related to the remaining provisions of the statute, pertaining to the 
notice of lapse by the surface owner directed to the mineral owner asserting 
the lack of any use for a twenty-year or longer hiatus, and the statement of 
claim which the mineral owner may assert in an attempt to defeat the 
surface owner’s claim.  
4. Section 4: Statement of Claim – Recording – Time 
This section, logically follows Section 3(g), which made reference to 
the statement of claim.70  There are three parts, as follows: 
 
(a) The statement of claim by the mineral owner was required to 
be recorded in the county records prior to the end of the twenty-
year period (with a two-year grace period after the effective date of 
the Act, i.e. August 1985).71  
                                                        
68. Id. 
69. See Act of Apr. 24, 2009, 2009 N.D. Laws ch. 317 § 1. 
70. There is currently no longer a Section 3(g), because the original Section 3(f), relating to 
the paying of taxes was eliminated, so that it became the new Section 3(f). See Act of Mar. 19, 
2015, 2015 N.D. Laws ch. 62 § 14. 
71. Abandoned Mineral Rights Act, 1983 N.D. Laws 1283, 1284. 
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(b) The statement of claim was required to contain the name and 
address of the record mineral owner, together with a legal 
description of the tract on or under which the mineral interest is 
located, and the type of mineral interest involved.72 
(c) The statement of claim was required to be recorded in the 
office of the county records in which the mineral interest is 
located.73 
 
 Subsection (c) actually overlaps (a), since it simply repeats that the 
mineral owner must record it, and the county recorder’s office [formerly 
register of deeds’ office] is the only place in which that can be done. 
5. Section 5: Failure to record the statement of claim 
Failure to record the statement of claim in a timely fashion did not in 
fact cause the mineral interest to be lost to the mineral owner if the owner 
did one of the following three things: 
 
(1) Owned one or more mineral interests in the county in which 
the mineral interest in  question was located at the time of the 
expiration of the 20-year period; or 
(2) Inadvertently failed to preserve the mineral interest in question; 
or 
(3) Within sixty days after publication of the notice of lapse 
(discussed in Section 6 below) recorded a statement of claim.74 
 
Section 5 was somewhat peculiar and superfluous, attributable perhaps 
to the fact that the 1983 Act was the first legislation of this kind to be 
created in North Dakota.  The first option under Section 5 does not make 
much sense because it allows the mineral owner to avoid the time limit 
simply because of ownership of other unrelated mineral interests in the 
same county.  The second option would certainly have created litigation 
around the question of what is precisely meant by “inadvertently” (which 
was stricken in 1989, as stated below).  The third option is covered in 
Section 6 below. 
                                                        
72. Id. § 4(2). In North Dakota this would be, for the most part, oil and gas. 
73. Id. § 4(3). 
74. Id. § 5(3). 
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6.  Section 6: Notice of Lapse of mineral Interest – Method. 
Section 6 is the critical provision for the surface owner and is 
essentially the only part of the statute that has come before the North 
Dakota Supreme Court multiple times, as discussed below.  These notice of 
lapse provisions were originally stated as follows and have undergone some 
significant amending since 1983. 
 
(1) Any person intending to succeed to ownership of a mineral 
interest that has lapsed after the twenty-year period must give 
notice of the lapse by publication in  the official newspaper of the 
county where the interest is located. 
(2) The publication of the notice of lapse shall be made once each 
week for three successive weeks. However, if the address of the 
mineral owner is “shown of record or can be determined upon 
reasonable inquiry,” notice must also be made by mailing a copy 
of the notice to the mineral owner within ten days after the last 
publication. 
(3) The notice of lapse must contain the name of the record owner 
of the mineral interest; a description of the land on which the 
mineral interest in question is located; and the  name of the person 
giving the notice. 
(4) A copy of the notice and an affidavit of service of the notice, if 
recorded in the county  records of the county in which the mineral 
interest is located, is prima facie notice in any legal proceedings that 
such notice has been given.75  
 
The 1983 Act did not expressly state that the notice of lapse must be 
recorded, but this was amended in 1989 so that recording of the notice of 
lapse is now required.76  The provision in subsection (4) pertaining to legal 
proceedings seems to suggest that the drafters may have anticipated the 
likelihood of litigation arising under the Act, as has in fact occurred.77  
Conceptually, the original aim was to allow the ownership of what were 
deemed to be “unused mineral interests” to pass to the surface owner, if the 
                                                        
75. Id. § 6. 
76. 1989 N.D. Laws ch. 441 § 4.  
77. Spring Creek Ranch, LLC. v. Svenberg, 1999 ND 113, 595 N.W.2d 323 was the first 
case to reach the North Dakota Supreme Court on the abandoned minerals issue. Subsequent cases 
are discussed individually infra Part VI. 
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various steps set out in the statute were taken.78  Upon completion of those 
steps, title to the mineral interest would vest automatically in the surface 
owner, without the necessity of a recordable judgment or other document to 
confirm the surface owner’s title.79  This has not necessarily been the case, 
as evidenced by the litigation and the 2009 amendment which inserted a 
new provision for quiet title actions discussed below.80 
Under the 1983 Act, a surface owner intending to succeed to the 
ownership of a mineral interest upon its lapse was required to give notice by 
publication once every week for three weeks in the county newspaper.81  If 
the address of the mineral owner was of record, or could be determined by 
reasonable inquiry, notice was also required to be given by mailing a copy 
of the notice of lapse to the mineral owner within ten days after the last 
publication.82  This requirement is essentially the same in the current 
statute, except that additional provisions have been added, as described 
below.83  In addition, a substantial number of cases before the North Dakota 
Supreme Court have dealt with the notice requirement, in particular with 
the “reasonable inquiry” provision, as discussed in detail below. 
A mineral owner could forestall any attempt by the surface owner to 
acquire the mineral interest by recording a statement of claim in the county 
recorder’s office.84  The statement of claim was required to contain the 
address of the mineral owner, and a legal description of the land in question 
with a statement of the type of mineral interest involved.85  Under the 2009 
amendments to the 1983 Act, the statement of claim would remain effective 
to cancel the impending lapse of the mineral interest so long as it was 
recorded within sixty days after the first publication of the surface owner’s 
notice of lapse.86  Although the statute was not as clearly written as it could 
                                                        
78. 1983 N.D. Laws 1283 which states:  
AN ACT to provide for the termination of mineral interest in land owned by persons 
other than the owners of the surface and for the vesting of title to dormant mineral 
interests in the surface owners in the absence of appropriate developmental activities 
or the recording of a notice of claim of interest within a specified period. 
79. See 2009 N.D. Laws, ch. 317 § 2 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-02 (West 
2017)). 
80. See 2009 N.D. Laws, ch. 317 § 5, at 11 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-
06.1 (West 2017)). 
81. 1983 N.D. Laws 1285. 
82. Id.  
83. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-06 (West 2017). 
84. 1983 N.D. Laws 1284. 
85. Id.  
86. 2009 N.D. Laws, ch. 317 § 3 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-05(1) (West 
2017)). 
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be, it is clear that a statement of claim could be recorded prior to the end of 
the twenty-year period, not in response to a notice of lapse but simply as a 
means of protecting the mineral owner’s interest.87  In other words, after the 
enactment in 1983 and for twenty years thereafter, owners of mineral 
interests could simply record statements of claim of ownership to protect 
their interests, even if there had been no existing notice of lapse.88  One 
would expect that there would have been a substantial number of such 
statements of claim recorded in the county records during the twenty years 
following 1983, and this was in fact the case.89 
C. SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENTS TO THE 1983 ACT 
1. 1989 Amendments 
Several small, though important, changes were made in the Act in the 
1989 legislative session, clarifying oversights in the original provisions.90  
In the original 1983 version, a mineral interest was deemed to be abandoned 
if it was unused for twenty years.91  This was ambiguous because there was 
no specification of the beginning point of the twenty years.  For example, it 
could apply to some twenty-year period far in the past.  This was clarified 
in a 1989 amendment by including the language “twenty years, immediately 
preceding the first publication of the notice [of lapse].”92 
Another clarification was made by inserting the word “first” so that the 
sixty-day period for filing a statement of claim was sixty days after the first 
publication of the notice of lapse.93  The word “inadvertently” was stricken, 
thereby eliminating the possible problem raised by the meaning of that 
word in Section 3(2).94  The other very minor change is not relevant.95 
                                                        
87. 2009 N.D. Laws, ch. 317 § 2; 2009 N.D. Laws, ch. 317 § 4. 
88. 2009 N.D. Laws, ch. 317 § 4 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-06 (West 
2017)). 
89. In the 2009 amendments to the North Dakota Act a provision was added to the section on 
statements of claim clarifying that a statement of claim may be recorded by a person other than the 
record owner of the mineral interest so long as it is accompanied by a reference to the name of the 
record owner. N.D. CENT CODE ANN § 38-18.1-04 (West 2017). 
90. 1989 N.D. Laws 1186.  
91. 1983 N.D. Laws 1283. 
92. 1989 N.D. Laws 1186. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. (changed “inadvertently failed” to “has failed,” referring to recording statements of 
claim). 
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2. 2001 Amendment 
A change that was made in the 2001 session was not a specific 
amendment to the Act, but simply an overall change in all relevant North 
Dakota statutes.  The 2001 amendment changed the county officer in charge 
of recording documentation of land titles from “register of deeds” to 
“county recorder.”96  This change is reflected in subsequent versions of the 
Act. 
3. 2005 Amendments 
The only change made in the 2005 legislative session was to add a 
section providing that payment of royalties, bonus payments, or any other 
payment to a named or unnamed interest-bearing account, trust account, 
escrow account, or any similar type of account on behalf of a person who 
cannot be located is not deemed to be “use” of a mineral interest for 
purposes of the Act.97  There is some further language in this section 
pertaining to such accounts, but it does not relate directly to the 
abandonment of mineral interests issue.98  It simply provides that any such 
payable account that has been in existence for three years and has not been 
claimed is deemed to be abandoned property.99  An account of this kind is, 
of course, personal property, so that this amendment is not relevant to real 
property mineral interests.100  Personal property can be readily abandoned 
and is deemed abandoned under North Dakota law after such a three-year 
period.101 
4. 2007 Amendments 
The only relevant change made to the Act in the 2007 legislative 
session was the addition of a provision to the effect that a surface owner 
who succeeds to the ownership of a mineral interest upon a lapse under the 
Act is “entitled to record a statement of succession in interest indicating that 
the owner has succeeded to ownership of the mineral interest.”102  This 
would constitute recorded proof that the mineral interest had reverted to 
                                                        
96. 2001 N.D. Laws ch. 120 § 1. 
97. 2005 N.D. Laws 1255. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. 
100. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 47-01-03 (West 2017). 
101. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 47-30.1-02 (West 2017) (Uniform Unclaimed Property 
Act). 
102. 2007 N.D. Laws 1220; see also N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-06(5) (West 2017). 
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ownership by the named surface owner, without the necessity of the surface 
owner obtaining a judgment in a quiet title action.103  A document of this 
kind, however, would not be legally equivalent to an actual judgment in 
favor of the surface owner, as there would always be a possibility, though 
not a likelihood, for a fraudulent statement of succession to be recorded.104  
This was presumably a reason for the possibility of a quiet title action, 
added to the Act in 2009, as discussed below. 
5. 2009 Amendments 
A fairly extensive revision of portions of the 1983 Act was carried out 
in the 2009 legislative session.105  These revisions are set out in Sections 1 
through 5 of the “2009 Amendment,” which are not necessarily the same 
section numbers as laid out in the 1983 Act itself. 
Section 1 of the 2009 amendment contains a single very logical change, 
striking from the original 1983 list of activities that had been deemed to 
constitute a “use” of a mineral interest the following language:  “The owner 
or lessee utilizes the mineral interest in a manner pursuant to, or authorized 
by the instrument creating the mineral interest.”106  Eliminating this 
language was a wise choice since, as discussed above, this original 
language was circular and essentially meaningless. 
Section 2 of the 2009 amendment made a minor change by eliminating 
the original 1983 provision for an extra two-year period in connection with 
the recording of a statement of claim, which was no longer applicable after 
July 1, 1985.107  A more substantive change was made by the addition of 
the following language added to subsection 4 of the 2009 amendments, 
pertaining to the recording of the statement of claim and clarifying that a 
statement of claim made by a person who was not the record mineral owner 
must be accompanied by identification of the actual record owner: 
 
A statement of claim filed after July 31, 2009, by a person other 
than the owner of record of the mineral interest is not effective to 
preserve a mineral interest unless accompanied by a reference to 
                                                        
103. 2007 N.D. Laws 1220. 
104. Id.  
105. 2009 N.D. Laws ch. 317.  
106. See id. (striking N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-03(1)(h) (West 2014)). 
107. 2009 N.D. Laws ch. 317 § 2.  
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the name of the record owner under whom the owner of the 
mineral interest claims.108 
 
It is not clear why this was deemed necessary, as any attorney or agent 
acting for the mineral owner would normally automatically include the 
name of the record owner.  It is possible that there may have been a concern 
that there were persons who were not the mineral owners, but who went 
around and recorded false statements of claim or statements that might not 
have been completely legitimate. 
Section 3 of the 2009 amendments completely replaces the original 
1983 Section 4, and in its place lists two activities that will prevent a 
mineral owner’s failure to timely record a statement of claim from causing a 
mineral interest to be “extinguished” due to the expiration of the twenty-
year period.109  Specifically, the two activities are (1) filing a statement of 
claim with the county recorder within sixty days after first publication of 
the notice of lapse, or (2) filing with the county recorder documentation 
showing that at least one of the activities that the statute deems to be “uses” 
took place during the twenty-year period immediately preceding the first 
publication of the notice of lapse.110  The word “extinguished,” which is a 
holdover from the original 1983 provision is an odd choice, since the whole 
process is about “abandoned” or “dormant” mineral interests.  A mineral 
interest that reverts to the surface owner has not disappeared or been 
extinguished, but has simply become owned by another person or persons.  
No change in the nature of the mineral interest occurs by way of such a 
transfer of ownership.  The mineral interest is never “extinguished, nor is it 
“terminated,” as discussed above.  
The amendment then goes on to state that there is no extinguishment of 
the mineral interest if a person other than the record mineral owner files 
with the county recorder within sixty days after the first publication of the 
lapse notice an affidavit or declaration, under oath, which includes an 
explanation of the factual and legal bases for the person’s assertion of title 
to the mineral interest.111  This explanation must be accompanied by 
supporting documentation or an explanation as to why documentation is 
unavailable.112  
                                                        
108. Id.  
109. 2009 N.D. Laws ch. 317 § 3.  
110. Id. 
111. Id. at § 3(2). 
112. Id.   
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Section 4 of the 2009 amendments makes a very important addition, to 
its subsection 2, pertaining to the “reasonable inquiry” language. The 
original 1983 Act specified that if the address of the mineral owner is 
“shown of record or can be determined upon reasonable inquiry,” the 
surface owner must, in addition to the publication of the notice of lapse, 
mail a copy of it to the mineral owner.113  The original statute, however, did 
not contain any clues as to what might constitute a reasonable inquiry.  
The issue of whether a  reasonable inquiry is required in the attempt to 
locate an address of the mineral owner does not arise unless there is actually 
no record address of any kind.114  That is, it is not a matter of whether the 
surface owner may satisfy the need for an address to mail a notice of lapse 
either by searching the county records or by conducting a reasonable 
inquiry in some other way.115  In other words, the underlined word “or” 
above does not mean that the surface owner could decide to do either one or 
the other.116  This has been made very clear in the North Dakota Supreme 
Court decisions discussed below; a reasonable inquiry is appropriate only 
when no address of record can be located.117 
The “reasonable inquiry” requirement dates back to the original 1983 
Act, but there had been no statutory provision as to what was meant by that 
term until the 2009 amendment.  The 2009 amendment reads as follows: 
 
To constitute a reasonable inquiry . . . the owner or owners of the 
surface estate or the owner’s authorized agent must conduct a 
search of: 
a.  The county recorder’s records for the existence of any uses 
as defined in section 38-18.1-03 by the owner of the mineral 
estate; 
                                                        
113. 1983 N.D. Laws 1285. 
114. Id. The statutory language itself seems to imply that either a record mailing address or 
instead an address obtained by a reasonable inquiry can be used. This, however, is not how the 
North Dakota Supreme Court has construed the statute. See  cases cited in note 117. 
115. See Sorenson v. Felton, 2011 ND 33, 793 N.W.2d 799; see also Sorenson v. Alinder, 
2011 ND 36, 793 N.W.2d 797. In these cases, the Court first ruled that if a record address of the 
mineral owner existed it must be used instead of making a reasonable inquiry. Subsequent 
decisions, discussed infra, confirmed this, and made it clear that there was no option between the 
two if there was in fact an address of record. 
116. See parenthetical supra note 115.  
117. See Johnson v. Taliaferro, 2011 ND 34, 793 N.W.2d 804; Capps v. Weflen, 2014 ND 
201, 855 N.W.2d 637; Nelson v. McAlester Fuel Co. 2017 ND 49, 891 N.W.2d 126; and Huebner 
v. Furlinger, 2017 ND 145, 896 N.W.2d 258, discussed infra. 
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b. The clerk of court’s records for the existence of any 
judgments, liens, or probate records which identify the owner 
of the mineral interest; 
c. The social security death index for the last-known residence 
of the owner of the mineral interest, if deceased; and 
d. One or more public internet databases to locate or identify 
the owner of the mineral interest or any known heirs of the 
owner. The owner or owners of the surface estate are not 
required to conduct internet searches on private fee internet 
databases.118 
 
The first requirement in conducting a reasonable inquiry – the search of 
the county recorder’s records for the existence of any of the defined uses of 
a mineral interest – appears unlikely to produce any useful information.  
The statutory “uses,” apart from actually reading a statement of claim, are: 
 
a. minerals of some kind are being produced from the tract in 
question 
b. operations are underway for injection, withdrawal, storage or 
disposal  
c. solid minerals are being produced from a common vein or seam 
d. the mineral interest is subject to a lease, mortgage, assignment 
or conveyance 
e. the interest is subject to a pooling or unitization order119 
 
Only a minority of these uses would normally be expected to produce 
any document that would be likely to have been filed in the county 
recorder’s office.  Leases, mortgages, assignments or conveyances are 
normally placed of record.120  Information on operations in (b), however, 
does not normally appear in the county records, nor would any 
documentation on production of solid minerals from a common vein or 
                                                        
118. 2009 N.D. Laws ch. 317 § 4.  
119. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-03(1)(a)-(e) (West 2017).  
120. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 11-18-01(1) (West 2017) (Explaining that only documents 
relating to ownership of relevant property are filed with the county recorder, and indexed to 
specific tracts of land. The recorder only maintains a record of “each patent, deed, mortgage, bill 
of sale, security agreement, judgment [pertaining to land], decree, lien, certificate of sale and other 
instruments required to be filed or admitted to record . . . .”). 
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seam.121  If affidavits of production are recorded to maintain leases in 
effect, it is possible that the production of oil and gas could result in 
information on names of mineral owners.  However, the lease information 
might sometimes be obsolete as to their addresses.122  In any case, the 
names of lessors would already have been located under (d).123  The same 
would normally be true for pooling or unitization orders, which are issued 
by the North Dakota Industrial Commission but normally are not 
recorded.124 
The second and third requirements for conducting a “reasonable 
inquiry,” that is the clerk of court’s records and social security death index, 
might possibly provide some information on addresses.125  The fourth one, 
regarding the search of a public internet database, appears to be quite 
vaguely described.126  There is no definition of a “public internet database,” 
so that litigation would be likely to try to establish whether this requirement 
had been satisfied or not.  It would seem that there would be such a large 
number of “public internet databases” that search of any random one of 
them would be meaningless.  Since there is no limitation on the description 
of a “public internet database,” it could be claimed that any public internet 
database could suffice.  However, this would almost inevitably lead to legal 
disputes as to whether or not the statutory provision had been satisfied.  The 
drafters’ intention was probably appropriate, but the vague language of 
“one or more public databases” appears too broad to have any meaning. 
The final 2009 amendment adds an entirely new feature not based on 
anything in the original 1983 Act, entitled “Perfecting title in surface 
owner.”127  This new section provides that upon completion of the notice of 
lapse requirements the surface owner may bring a quiet title action to 
perfect title to the mineral interest by obtaining a judgment in his or her 
favor, which could then be recordable in the county in question.128  The 
curious thing, however, is that the surface owner had always been able, 
under already existing North Dakota law, to bring a quiet title action to 
                                                        
121. Id. 
122. If minerals have been produced for a considerable number of years under leases 
executed a number of years ago, it cannot be assumed that the address of record in the lease is still 
the current address of the mineral owner. 
123. 2009 N.D. Laws ch. 317 § 1. 
124. Id. 
125. There would be no certainty, however, that such address information would be current. 
126. 2009 N.D. Laws ch. 317 § 4. 
127. 2009 N.D. Laws ch. 317 § 5 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-06.1 (West 
2017)). 
128. Id. 
            
384 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 93:2 
obtain a judgment confirming title.129  In fact, the amendment itself 
provides that the action it was creating was subject to the same procedure as 
set out in existing law.130  Such a judgment is then “deemed conclusive 
except for fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct.”131  
It is odd that it must have been felt necessary to provide this separate 
statutory quiet title action provision when the surface owner could certainly 
bring an action under the existing traditional quiet title action statutes.  
There is one difference in this new quiet title section, however, though it 
does not appear to shed any light on a need for a separate statute.  In 
subsection 2 of Section 5 of the 2009 amendments it is stated that evidence 
must be presented to the district court establishing that all procedures 
required by the abandoned minerals act were properly completed, and that a 
reasonable inquiry (emphasis added), as defined in Section 4 of the 2009 
amendment, was conducted.132  As discussed above, however, and as stated 
in a number of North Dakota Supreme Court cases discussed below, there is 
no requirement for a reasonable inquiry if there is an address of record of 
the mineral owner.133  It appears, therefore, that this special quiet title action 
is not available for cases in which there has been an address of record, 
which is probably the most common scenario, based on the Court decisions 
discussed below.134  In those cases, since a reasonable inquiry would not 
have been made unless the surface owner chose to make a non-required 
one, the surface owner could ignore the new provision and simply use the 
traditional quiet title action provisions instead: 
 
An action may be maintained by any person having an estate or an 
interest in, or lien or encumbrance upon, real property, whether in 
or out of possession thereof and whether such property is vacant or 
unoccupied, against any person claiming an estate or interest in, or 
                                                        
129. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-17-01 (West 2017). 
130. 2009 N.D. Laws ch. 317 § 5 (“This action must be brought in the same manner and is 
subject to the same procedure as an action to quiet title pursuant to chapter 32-17.”). 
131. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-06.1 (West 2017). This would be true, of course, with 
almost any judgment. 
132. 2009 N.D. Laws ch. 317 § 5 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE ANN § 38-18.1-06(6) (West 
2017)). 
133. See parenthetical supra note 117. 
134. In the North Dakota Supreme Court opinions discussed infra, a principal issue has been 
the matter of the address of record of the mineral owner, and it is not clear whether the new 
Section 5 in the 2009 amendments, which is entitled “Perfecting title in surface owners” and 
which adds provisions for a quiet action, has been used in any of the cases. If so, a reasonable 
inquiry would have been required. 
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lien or encumbrance upon, the same, for the purpose of 
determining such adverse estate, interest, lien or encumbrance.135 
 
The successful surface owner certainly has a mineral interest in the 
property because the Act provides that title vests in the surface owner upon 
abandonment.136  Perhaps it could be argued that mineral interests cannot be 
“vacant or unoccupied,” and therefore, this traditional quiet title statute 
could not be applicable.  This would be a specious argument since the 
statute clearly applies to interests of any kind in real property, and mineral 
interests still in place are certainly real property. 
It is also interesting in this context that the North Dakota Supreme 
Court has expressly stated the Termination of Minerals Interest Act is 
totally separate from a quiet title action: “We have drawn a clear distinction 
between the statutory abandoned minerals procedure under N.D.C.C. ch. 
38-18.1 and a subsequent quiet title action, and have emphasized they are 
entirely separate, distinct procedures.”137 
It is clear, however, what the Court means; the statutory procedure 
passes the title to the surface owner, who may elect to judicially confirm the 
passage of title.138  Technically, though, the quiet title action in § 38-18.1-
06.1 is a part of the Termination of Mineral Interest Act. 
The 2009 amendments also included a minor change from the language 
in the 1983 Act, which allowed “any person” intending to succeed to the 
ownership of a mineral interest to give notice of lapse.139  Although the 
1983 language did not place any kind of limitation on who was authorized 
to publish and mail a notice of lapse, it was presumably the intent of the 
drafters that surface owners were the only persons entitled to do this.140  
This language was replaced in 2009 by the language “the owner or owners 
                                                        
135. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-17-01 (West 2017). 
136. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-02 (West 2017) (“Title to the abandoned mineral 
interest vests in the owner or owners of the surface estate in the land in or under which the mineral 
interest is located on the date of abandonment.”). 
137. Peterson v. Jasmanka, 2014 ND 40, 842 N.W.2d 920, 925. 
138. The only likely reason for bringing a quiet title action would appear to be for a 
successful surface owner to obtain a judgment of a court that could then be placed on record so 
there would no question about ownership of the mineral interest. The “statement of succession in 
interest” which the surface owner is entitled to record, showing the passage of ownership from the 
mineral owner, added as 2007 N.D. Laws 1220 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-02 
(West 2017)) as stated above, would show the transfer of record, but is not equivalent to an actual 
judgment by a court. 
139. 1983 N.D. Laws 1285. 
140. See supra note 66, showing that the purpose of the Act was to allow “the surface 
owners,” and not simply “any person,” at random to acquire a dormant mineral interest. 
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of the surface estate in the land in or under which the mineral interest is 
located.”141  This change might appear minor, but it makes it clear that it 
must be a surface owner who creates the notice of lapse.  Not just anybody 
could go out and try to acquire abandoned mineral interests.  
6. 2015 Amendment 
The 2009 amendments to the Act, therefore, created the most 
significant changes.  A very minor change was made in the 2015 legislative 
session, by striking “taxes are paid on the mineral interest” from the list of 
deemed “uses” of a mineral interest.142  It was simply a tidying up of the 
statute, since North Dakota does not assess property taxes on mineral 
interests as such.143 
V. THE MODEL DORMANT MINERAL INTERESTS ACT 
Given the amount of interest that has been given to this issue in mineral 
law, and the number of states (50% at least) which have now enacted 
statutes dealing with the issue it is not surprising that there is a Model 
Dormant Mineral Interests Act.144  Originally named the Uniform Dormant 
Minerals Interests Act, it was drafted by the National Commissioners on 
Uniform State Law at its annual conference in August 1986, and approved 
by the American Bar Association on February 16, 1987.145  The name 
change was approved by the Executive Committee on January 17, 1999.146  
This was logical since Uniform Laws are generally drafted to become the 
law in the states where they are adopted, whereas Model Acts are usually 
not enacted as such, but rather are intended to provide guides for 
                                                        
141. 2009 N.D. Laws ch. 317 § 4(1). Those entitled to make use of the Act are:  
the owner or owners of the surface estate in the land in or under which the mineral 
interest is located intending to succeed to the ownership of a mineral interest upon its 
lapse shall give notice of the lapse of the mineral interest by publication [in addition to 
the notice by mail]. 
142. 2015 N.D. Laws, ch. 62 § 14(f), at 9. 
143. There was an old “mineral rights privilege tax” on severed minerals (N.D. CENT. CODE 
ANN. § 57-49-01), which was repealed in 1955. Several of the North Dakota taxes on the 
extraction and production of minerals such as oil and coal are referred to in the relevant tax 
statutes as “property” taxes in certain specific contexts, but there is no general property tax 
assessment of minerals in place. See, for example, N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 57-51-02.1 (West 
2017) (oil and gas gross production tax), and N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 57-65-04 (West 2017) 
(potash extraction tax). 
144. This will be referred to for purposes of this discussion as “The Model Act.” 
145. MODEL DORMANT MINERAL INTERESTS ACT (1986). 
146. Id. The Conference changed the designation of the Dormant Mineral Interests Act from 
Uniform to Model as approved by the Executive Committee on January 17, 1999. 
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formulating individual state laws.  A model act is not usually meant to be 
enacted exactly as it is written, but is provided by suggestion to the various 
state legislatures, from which they create their own law.  It is somewhat like 
a blueprint for an actual statute, as modified by legislative action in each 
particular state.  Since approval of the Model Act was not final until 1987, 
the 1983 North Dakota Act cannot be said to have been specifically 
influenced by it, but there are, of course, similarities between them. 
A. MODEL ACT: SECTION 1 
This section is simply a statement of policy. It lays out the purpose for 
which a state might be interested in adopting the Act. It is a more 
appropriate name, in my opinion, for this kind of legislation, as it does not 
refer to a mineral interest as being abandoned, terminated or extinguished, 
but rather as having been unused, i.e. “dormant,” for the specified period of 
time. 
 
(a) The public policy of this State is to enable and encourage 
marketability of real property and to mitigate the adverse effect of 
dormant mineral interests on the full use and development of both 
surface and mineral interests in real property.  
(b) This [Act] shall be construed to effectuate its purpose to 
provide a means for termination of dormant mineral interests that 
impair marketability of real property147 
 
The notion of marketability of real property runs throughout the 
discussions of dormant or abandoned minerals, though it does not seem that 
this would be a logical goal to aim for in all cases.  For example, when 
there is a dormant, i.e. unused, mineral interest underlying the surface, it 
would seem that the fact that it remains dormant would mean that it is 
unlikely that there will be disruptive surface activities in a search for 
underlying minerals, so that the value of the surface may be impaired rather 
than improved by use of the mineral interest.  The argument that full use 
and development of the surface would be advanced by reversion of the 
mineral interest to the surface interest seems unduly simplistic in some 
cases. 
                                                        
147. MODEL DORMANT MINERAL INTERESTS ACT (1986). 
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B. MODEL ACT: SECTION 2 
This section defines “mineral interest” as an interest in a mineral estate, 
however created and regardless of form.  It also defines “minerals, as such, 
listing a substantial variety.  Even steam and geothermal interests, which 
would not normally seem to be minerals, are specifically included:  
 
(1) “Mineral interest” means an interest in a mineral estate, 
however created and regardless of form, whether absolute or 
fractional, divided or undivided, corporeal or incorporeal, 
including a fee simple or any lesser interest or any kind of royalty, 
production payment, executive right, nonexecutive right, 
leasehold, or lien, in minerals, regardless of character. 
(2) “Minerals’ includes gas, oil, coal, and other gaseous, liquid and 
solid hydrocarbons, oil shale, etc. . . . steam and other geothermal 
resources, and any other substances defined as a mineral by the 
law of this State.” 148 
 
Subsection 2 lists many other substances as minerals.  However, for 
North Dakota purposes, they need not be listed, as the North Dakota 
Century Code defines “minerals” in various places and the North Dakota 
Supreme Court has addressed the issue in a number of opinions over the 
years.  The listing of “steam and other geothermal sources” is curious.  
Those are not minerals in North Dakota and it is difficult to visualize how 
any state would define them as “minerals,” but presumably the drafters did 
not want to overlook any possibility, and a state could conceivably define 
steam as a “mineral” if it actually chose to do so.  The Comment to Section 
2 in the Model Act does state “The definitions in this section are broadly 
drafted to include all the various forms of minerals and mineral interests.”  
It is difficult, however, to imagine steam being abandoned or dormant.  
Probably what is meant is a site at which steam could be utilized. 
C. MODEL ACT: SECTION 3 
Section 3 simply states that the Model Act does not apply to mineral 
interests owned by the United States, an Indian tribe, a state, or a state 
agency, unless otherwise provided by federal or state law or by treaties, and 
                                                        
148. Id. § 2. 
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does not affect water rights.149  The Comment to this section does point out 
that while Section 2 defines the term “minerals,” it is not intended to 
redefine minerals and mineral interests for purposes other than the Model 
Act.150 
D. MODEL ACT: SECTION 4 
Section 4 contains the important basic substance of the Model Act, 
with provisions similar to those in the North Dakota Act, summarized 
below. 
Subsection 4(a) provides that the surface owner may maintain an action 
to terminate a dormant mineral interest.151  “Dormant” means, as in North 
Dakota, that the mineral interest has been unused for a period of twenty or 
more years preceding commencement of the action.152  The action must be 
in the same nature and require the same notice as a quiet title action, and 
may be maintained whether the owner of the mineral’s whereabouts is 
known or unknown.153 
Subsection 4(b) provides a list of the activities that would constitute 
“use,” as follows: 
 
(1) Active mineral operations on or below the surface of the real 
property in question or other property unitized or pooled therewith, 
including production, geophysical exploration, exploratory or 
developmental drilling, mining, exploitation and development, but 
not including injection of substances for purposes of disposal or 
storage. 
(2) Payment of taxes on a separate assessment of the mineral 
interest or a transfer or severance tax relating to the mineral 
interest. 
(3) Recordation of an instrument that creates, reserves, or 
otherwise evidences a claim to the mineral interests, including an 
instrument that transfers, leases or divides the interest. 
                                                        
149. Id. § 3. 
150. See supra text accompanying note 22. 
151. MODEL DORMANT MINERAL INTERESTS ACT § 4(a) (1986). 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
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(4) Recordation of a judgment or decree that makes specific 
reference to the mineral interest.154 
 
This list of uses is generally similar to the North Dakota one discussed 
above,155 and also to the Indiana statue addressed by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Texaco v. Short,156 although it does not include production from a 
common vein or seam in the case of solid minerals.157  The specification of 
payment of taxes assessed on the mineral interest is the same as in the 
original North Dakota Act discussed above, which was eventually removed 
in 2015 since there was no such tax.158  The Model Act provision on taxes 
is somewhat more expansive, including a severance tax,159 but it does not 
seem plausible that there would be a severance tax on dormant or 
abandoned mineral interests, since there could have been no severance of 
minerals that were dormant or abandoned.  North Dakota, of course, has 
mineral severance taxes on oil and gas, as well as coal, but that is a separate 
matter from a property tax on minerals in the ground.160 
There is also a subsection 4(c), which provides that Section 2 applies 
regardless of “any provision to the contrary in the instrument that creates, 
reserves, transfers, leases, divides, or otherwise evidences the claim to or 
the continued existence of the mineral interest or in another recorded 
document, barring an earlier termination in the instrument.”161  This could 
have been stated more clearly, but the purpose of Subsection 4(c) is 
explained in the Comment to Section 4.162 
Subsection (c) is intended to preclude a mineral owner from evading 
the purpose of this Act by contracting for a very long or indefinite duration 
of the mineral interest.163  A lien on minerals having a thirty-year duration, 
for example, would be subject to termination after twenty years under this 
Act if there were no further activities involving the minerals or mineral 
interest.  This would clearly be the case under the North Dakota Act, since 
                                                        
154. Id. § 4(b).   
155. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18.1-03 (2017). 
156. 454 U.S. 516 (1982). 
157. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18.1-03(c) (2017). 
158. 2015 N.D. Laws § 14(1)(f). 
159. See MODEL DORMANT MINERAL INTERESTS ACT § 4(b)(2). 
160. The North Dakota severance tax on oil and gas is set out in N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 57-51 
and ch. 57-51.1 (West 2017); the coal severance tax is set out in N.D. CENT. CODE. ch. 57-61 
(West 2017). 
161. MODEL DORMANT MINERAL INTERESTS ACT § 4 (1986). 
162. Id. § 4 Comment. 
163. Id. § 4 Comment to subsection (c). 
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any unbroken twenty-year period would allow the surface owner to make a 
claim.164 
E. MODEL ACT: SECTION 5 
This section moves to the providing of some form of notification from 
the mineral owner of his or her claim to retain the mineral interest, in other 
words to defeat an attempt by the surface owner for reversion of the interest 
to the surface.165  This process is different from the usual North Dakota 
statement of claim process, but the goal is the same.  Subsection 5(a) 
provides that a mineral owner may at any time record a notice of intent to 
preserve the minerals or some part thereof.166  A mineral interest is not 
deemed to be dormant if the notice has been recorded within twenty years 
prior to the commencement of the action to terminate the mineral interest 
under Section 4 discussed above.167 
This is fundamentally different, therefore, from the North Dakota 
procedure, where the mineral owner files a statement of claim following the 
receipt of a notice of lapse from the surface owner.168  The goal is the same: 
to provide a procedure by which the mineral owner can resist or stave off a 
reversion of the mineral interest to the surface owner.  The main variation in 
procedures, of course, is that in the Model Act there must be a court action 
commenced, which will provide notice to the mineral owner of the surface 
owner’s attempt to recover the mineral interest.169  The commencement of 
such a legal action serves to bring the matter to the attention of the mineral 
owner but not in the same way as in North Dakota, where there is no 
mandatory legal action commenced by the surface owner.170  Instead, he or 
she publishes a notice of lapse for three weeks and mails a copy to the 
mineral owner’s last recorded address.171  It is possible in North Dakota, of 
course, and this does occur here, for a mineral owner to record a protective 
statement of claim even if there is no current procedure underway by a 
surface owner attempting to acquire the mineral interest. 
                                                        
164. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-02 (West 2017). 
165. MODEL DORMANT MINERAL INTERESTS ACT § 5. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. § 5(a). 
168. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-02 (West 2017). 
169. See MODEL DORMANT MINERAL INTERESTS ACT § (4)(a). 
170. The commencement of a court action under the Model Act would, of course, create 
notice to the mineral owner by the service of process. 
171. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-06(2) (West 2017). 
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The rest of Section 5 of the Model Act contains mostly details relating 
to the contents of the notice of the mineral owner’s intent to preserve the 
interest and the legal descriptions that need to be included.172  There is a 
rather unusual provision concerning how the mineral owner’s notice could 
include all of his or her other interests within the same county.173  The 
official Comment to this subsection states: 
 
Paragraph (3)(c) permits a blanket recording as to all interests in 
the county, provided that there is a prior recorded instrument, or a 
judgment whether or not recorded, that establishes the name of the 
mineral owner in the county records. The blanket recording 
provision is a practical necessity for large mineral owners.174 
 
There is no comparable provision in the North Dakota statute, and it 
seems unlikely that any state would adopt a provision which would allow 
all of the mineral interests of an owner in an entire county to be protected 
by the recording of a single notice.  It would, of course, be possible for a 
North Dakota mineral owner in a county to record a statement of claim that 
identified all of the interest owned, so long as the recorded statement is then 
indexed in the record as to each separate interest. 
F. MODEL ACT: SECTION 6 
Subsection 6(a) simply defines “litigation expenses” for purposes of 
Subsection 6(b).175  Subsection 6(b) is rather strange.  It provides when a 
court action has been commenced under Section 4: 
 
[T]he court shall permit the owner of the mineral interest to record 
a late notice of intent to preserve the mineral interest as a condition 
of dismissal of the action, upon payment into court for the benefit 
of the surface owner of the real property the litigation expenses 
attributable to the mineral interest or portion thereof as to which 
the noticed is recorded.176  
 
                                                        
172. MODEL DORMANT MINERAL INTERESTS ACT § 5.  
173. MODEL DORMANT MINERAL INTERESTS ACT § 5(c)(3). 
174. Id. § 5 cmt.  
175. See MODEL DORMANT MINERAL INTERESTS ACT § 6(a).  
176. Id. § 6(b). 
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A late notice of intent would be one which was not filed prior to the 
commencement of a court action, since that is the deadline for filing notice 
under Section 4.177  This Model Act provision apparently means that once 
an action has been commenced and a notice is not filed until after that, the 
court will recognize the late-filed notice and permit the surface owner to 
dismiss the action if the mineral owner will pay the surface owner’s 
litigation expenses.178  Presumably, the court will then confirm the title in 
the mineral owner, since the surface owner will have had his court action 
dismissed in exchange for receiving the litigation expenses.  This would not 
be an easy question for the surface owner to consider and choose, since it 
would be difficult to estimate the value of the mineral interest he or she 
might have been able to acquire in contrast to the litigation expenses 
received if the action is dismissed. 
This is interesting and quite unusual, but of course, it has no bearing on 
the North Dakota statute, since reversion of the mineral interest is self-
executing without a court judgment if the proper notice of lapse has been 
given by the surface owner and there is no statement of claim.179  
Furthermore, the Model Act’s Section 6 does not apply in an action in 
which a mineral interest has been unused for a period of 40 or more 
years.180 
G. MODEL ACT: SECTION 7 
Section 7 of the Model Act simply states that terminating a mineral 
interest merges the terminated interest with the surface estate in shares 
proportionate to the ownership of the surface estate.181  As stated above, 
this author cannot agree with the description of the mineral estate as 
“terminated,” although this term has been fairly widely adopted.  To 
“terminate” anything is to destroy its existence.182  When a mineral interest 
reverts to the overlying surface estate, however, the mineral does not cease 
to exist.  It simply has been re-connected to the surface interest.  The terms 
“abandoned” and “dormant” are certainly superior, since they connote the 
actual situation: a mineral interest that continues to exist but in the hands of 
the surface owner.  The word “terminated” is not really satisfactory, since it 
                                                        
177. Id. § 5(a). 
178. Id. § 6(b).  
179. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-02 (West 2017). 
180. MODEL DORMANT MINERAL INTERESTS ACT § 6(c). 
181. See id. § 7. 
182. WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1979) (Termination 
means “the end of something.”). 
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suggests a condition which does not exist.183  The term “abandoned” does 
not really meet with my approval either, of course, as discussed above but 
this is a technicality. 
H. MODEL ACT: SECTIONS 8-13 
These provisions are non-substantive as to the basic issue and have 
accordingly not been summarized here (savings and transitional provisions, 
uniformity of application and construction, short title, severability clause, 
effective date and repeals of existing statutes).  The Model Act has not been 
widely adopted as such.  A number of the provisions contained in it, 
however, are similar or parallel to the provisions in states which have 
adopted some form of this legislation. 
VI. THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT MEETS THE 
TERMINATION OF MINERALS ACT 
Inevitably, of course, the North Dakota Abandoned Minerals Act (or, 
as described in the North Dakota Century Code, the Termination of Mineral 
Interest Act)184 began to come before the North Dakota Supreme Court.185  
This is legislation that potentially has very significant consequences in 
terms of ownership and loss of ownership of real property.186  It came as no 
surprise, therefore, that the Court would become involved. After the 
Texaco, Inc. v. Short decision by the U.S. Supreme Court, there were no 
effective constitutional questions at stake.187  
A. SPRING CREEK RANCH, LLC V. SVENBERG 
The first North Dakota case before the Court involving the abandoned 
mineral issue, was Spring Creek Ranch, LLC v. Svenberg.188  This case 
involved activities that took place prior to all of the amendments made to 
the North Dakota Act, except the minor changes made in 1989, as discussed 
above.189  The scenario in this case is straightforward.  Spring Creek had 
                                                        
183. For this reason, the author of this Article cannot approve of the North Dakota statute’s 
description in the Century Code as “Termination of Mineral Interest.” N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 38-
18.1 (West 2017). 
184. Referred to hereinafter as “the Act.” 
185. Further references to “the Supreme Court” mean the North Dakota Supreme Court. 
186. Ownership of a mineral interest is, of course, ownership of real property. Geostar Corp. 
v. Parkway Petroleum, Inc., 495 N.W.2d 61 (N.D. 1993). 
187. See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982). 
188. Spring Creek Ranch, LLC. v. Svenberg, 1999 ND 113, 595 N.W.2d 323. 
189. See supra text accompanying note 92. 
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acquired the surface and one-half of the mineral interest, the other half 
mineral interest being owned by Svenberg.190  The 1983 Act provided that a 
surface owner seeking to acquire the mineral interest, or any part of it, must 
give notice of lapse of the interest by publication once each week for three 
weeks.191  This was done by the surface owner.192  The critical statutory 
requirement, however, was that: 
 
[I]f the address of the mineral interest owner is shown of record or 
can be determined upon reasonable inquiry, notice must also be 
made by mailing a copy of the notice to the owner of the mineral 
interest within ten days after the last publication is made.193 
 
At this point in the history of the legislation, it was considered 
appropriate for the surface owner to bring a quiet title action to confirm the 
passage of title if the mineral owner had not filed a timely statement of 
claim, although the North Dakota statute provided that the interest vested if 
the appropriate actions were taken under the provisions of the Abandoned 
Mineral Rights Act.194  The mineral owner’s address was not shown of 
record, and the district court concluded that Spring Creek had made a 
diligent, but unsuccessful, effort to locate the address.195  This was held to 
have satisfied the reasonable inquiry requirement, so that judgment was 
granted in favor of the surface owner.196  There had been no dispute as to 
whether the mineral interest had been used within the last twenty years, but 
simply whether the notice of lapse had been properly given.197  The district 
court accordingly granted summary judgment in favor of the surface owner, 
Spring Creek.198 
The Supreme Court on appeal focused its attention on the meaning of 
the vague “reasonable inquiry” requirement.199  The surface owner argued 
that a search of the records of the county Register of Deeds (now Recorder), 
                                                        
190. See Svenberg, ¶¶ 2-7, 595 N.W.2d at 324-25. 
191. 1983 N.D. Laws 1285. 
192. Id.  
193. Id. 
194. 1983 N.D. Laws 1283. 
195. See Svenberg, ¶ 5, 595 N.W.2d at 325. 
196. Id., ¶ 8, 595 N.W.2d at 326.  
197. See id. ¶ 11, 595 N.W.2d at 326 (“Whether the successors’ interest was unused for the 
statutorily mandated twenty years is not in dispute in this case.”). 
198. Id. ¶ 1, 595 N.W.2d at 324.  
199. Id. ¶¶ 15-20, 595 N.W.2d at 327-29. 
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which would contain copies of any transfers of interests in the property, was 
sufficient, although Spring Creek actually had searched the records in the 
County Clerk of Court’s office, the County Sherriff’s office, and the records 
of the County Auditor and County Treasurer as a precaution, and found no 
relevant information.200  At this stage of the legislation, “reasonable 
inquiry” was an undefined standard, but as a practical matter searches were 
being made in a number of locations.201  Whether a search constituted a 
“reasonable inquiry” at this point in time was, accordingly a question of 
fact, as there were no statutory standards defining the steps that must be 
taken to constitute such an inquiry: 
 
Whether Spring Creek made a reasonable inquiry to ascertain the 
addresses of the mineral interest owners is a material fact 
necessary to the ultimate decision whether Spring Creek strictly 
complied with N.D.C.C. chapter 38-18.1. Based on the record, 
reasonable minds could differ when deciding whether Spring 
Creek’s inquiry was reasonable. Because reasonable minds could 
reach more than one conclusion from the facts, we conclude the 
trial court erred when deciding Spring Creek made a reasonable 
inquiry as a matter of law. Summary judgment was therefore 
inappropriate.202 
 
 Accordingly, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings 
consistent with its opinion.203  At this early stage of construing the Act, 
therefore, the issue of the sufficiency of providing the notice of lapse to the 
mineral owner was the central matter.  Proceeding through the following 
cases, one will see that this continues to be the primary focus, although 
there have been changes, both in the statutes and in the Court’s focus that 
attempt to solve this issue.  In addition, the apparent belief that a quiet title 
action was necessary for the title to vest will fade away, but the bringing of 
a quiet title action in any case seems to continue to have been the usual 
procedure. 
                                                        
200. Id. ¶ 15, 595 N.W.2d at 327. 
201. Svenberg, ¶ 15, 595 N.W.2d at 327. 
202. Id. ¶ 20, 595 N.W.2d at 328-29. 
203. Id. ¶ 23, 595 N.W.2d at 329. 
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B. MILLER V. DIAMOND RESOURCES, INC. 
The next case before the Court that had any connection with the Act 
was Miller v. Diamond Resources, Inc.204  However, it did not deal with any 
substantive issue under the Act.  The case dealt with an alleged negligence 
question concerning proximate cause in mailing the notice of lapse and did 
not contain any holding bearing on the Act itself.205 
C. HALVORSON V. STARR 
Halvorson v. Starr is a good example of how careful the surface 
owners must to be in order to satisfy the notice of lapse requirements.206  
The background is typical of these cases, in that the surface owners sought 
to acquire the underlying mineral interest by publishing and mailing the 
notice of lapse.207  The deadline for mailing a copy of the notice to the 
mineral owner is ten days after the last publication is made, which has 
remained the same since the original 1983 statute.208  The date of last 
publication was Tuesday, March 21, 1990, but the surface owners mailed a 
copy of the notice of lapse to the record owner on Monday, April 2, 
1990.209  This was the eleventh day, since the day of the mailing is not 
counted but the last day of course is counted under the statutory provision 
for counting of days.210  
The surface owners, as customary, brought a quiet title action to secure 
a judgment.211  There would have been eleven days in this particular case if, 
as the surface owners argued, the number of days was counted as in the 
1997 amendment to N.D.C.C. §1-03-05, under which neither Saturday nor 
Sunday were counted.212  The amendment was not effective until 1997, 
since statutory changes are not retroactive unless so specified.213  Since 
under the statute in effect in 1990, March 31 (Saturday) was included, so 
                                                        
204. 2005 ND 150, 703 N.W.2d 316. 
205. Miller, ¶ 9, 703 N.W.2d at 320. 
206. Halvorson v. Starr, 2010 ND 133, 785 N.W.2d 248. 
207. Id. ¶¶ 2-3, 785 N.W.2d at 249. 
208. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-06(2) (West 2017). 
209. Halvorson, 2005 ND 150, ¶ 2, 785 N.W.2d at 249. 
210. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 1-02-15 (West 2017) (“The time in which any act provided 
by law is to be done is computed by excluding the first day and including that last, unless the last 
is a holiday, and then it also is excluded.”). 
211. Halvorson, ¶ 3, 785 N.W.2d at 249. See also supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
(As shown above, N.D. CENT CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-02 (West 2017) provides that the mineral 
interest vests in the surface owner if the appropriate statutory steps have been taken.). 
212. 1997 N.D. Laws, ch. 52 § 1 (“Acts performed on Saturdays”). 
213. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 1-02-10 (West 2017). 
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that it was 10th day and April 1 (Sunday) was excluded, April 2 was 
therefore the 11th day, which meant that the mailing of the notice of lapse 
had been a day too late.214  Therefore, since the required deadline for the 
mailing of the notice of lapse had not been met, the Court ruled in favor of 
the mineral owners.215 
D. SORENSON V. FELTON 
Sorenson v. Felton was the first case to be dated after the 1989, 2005 
and 2007 amendments to the Act, discussed above, but the occurrences in 
question in the case occurred in January 2007, prior to the 2007 
amendments, so that they are not applicable. 216  This was an appeal from a 
quiet title action brought by the surface owner, Sorenson, seeking to acquire 
the mineral interest owned of record by Felton.217  There had been no use of 
the mineral interest for more than twenty years, so that the sole issue was 
whether a copy of the notice of lapse published by Sorenson in January 
2007 had been properly mailed in accordance with the statute then in 
effect.218  The notice was mailed to the address that appeared in a recorded 
personal representative’s deed distributing the mineral interest to Felton in 
1984.219  Sorenson had also conducted an unsuccessful internet inquiry in 
an attempt to verify a current address for Felton.220  The issue before the 
Court, therefore, was whether the statutory provisions for the mailing of a 
copy of the notice of lapse to the mineral owner had been followed.221  
Since the 1983 provisions were still in effect, the requirement was:   
 
[I]f the address of the mineral owner is shown of record or can be 
determined upon reasonable inquiry [emphasis added] . . . notice 
must also be made by mailing a copy of the notice to the owner of 
the mineral interest within ten days after the last publication is 
made.222  
 
                                                        
214. See Halvorson, ¶ 11, 785 N.W.2d at 252. 
215. Id. at ¶ 13, 785 N.W.2d at 253. 
216. Sorenson v. Felton, 2011 ND 33, 793 N.W.2d 799. 
217. Id. ¶¶ 3-5, 793 N.W.2d at 801. 
218. Id.  ¶¶ 10-13, 793 N.W.2d at 802-03. 
219. Id.  ¶¶ 3-4, 793 N.W.2d at 801. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. ¶¶ 10-13, 793 N.W.2d 802-03. 
222. 1983 N.D. Laws ch. 413, § 6(2) (N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18.1-06(2) (West 2017)). 
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The mineral owner was eventually located, residing in another state, by 
a petroleum landman, and, although the Court’s opinion does not actually 
state this, it is clear that the notice mailed to the mineral owner’s no longer 
current 1984 address was not delivered to her.223  She did record a 
statement of claim in January 2008, which was of course substantially later 
than the sixty-day period following the date of first publication as required 
by the statute.224  This was not an issue, however, as the question was the 
validity of the attempt to mail the notice of lapse.225  Timely recording of a 
statement of claim by the mineral owner would prevent the vesting of title 
in a surface owner, but such vesting does not occur in any case where the 
requirement pertaining to the notice of lapse has not been met.226  
Since this was a quiet title action, there was a judgment from the 
district court, which ruled that the surface owner did not strictly comply 
with the statute because he did not conduct a reasonable inquiry.227  At this 
stage of the law, prior to the 2009 amendments, the statute contained no 
language as to what constituted a reasonable inquiry.  This was also not a 
question before the Court, however, since it held that a reasonable inquiry 
was not required if an attempt to mail the notice to an address of record was 
made.228  The statute does not require a reasonable inquiry to be made to 
seek a current address if the notice has been mailed to an address of record: 
 
It is undisputed that Sorenson complied with the publication 
requirements. Then section 38-18.1-06(2) requires notice by mail 
“if the address of the mineral interest owner is shown of record or 
can be determined upon reasonable inquiry . . . The word ‘or’ is 
disjunctive in nature and ordinarily indicates an alternative 
between different things or actions . . . The words “shown of 
record” and “determined upon reasonable inquiry” relate to 
separate and alternative considerations for how a surface owner is 
to obtain the mineral owner’s address for mailing the notice . . . 
These phrases have independent legal significance because each 
requires different conduct based on the information available to the 
                                                        
223. Sorenson, ¶ 5, 793 N.W.2d at 801. 
224. 1989 N.D. Laws ch. 441 § 3(1) (N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18.1-05(2) (West 2017)). 
225. See Sorenson, ¶¶ 10-15, 793 N.W.2d at 802-03. 
226. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-06 (West 2017). 
227. See Sorenson, ¶ 6, 793 N.W.2d at 801. 
228. Id. ¶ 14-15, 793 N.W.2d at 803. 
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surface owner. Therefore, we conclude the word ‘or’ is disjunctive 
in section 38-18.1-06(2).229 
 
 Accordingly, the Court held that mailing the notice to a record address 
for the mineral owner is sufficient, without requiring any reasonable inquiry 
to be made stating that “Under our construction, Sorenson was required to 
conduct a reasonable inquiry only if Felton’s address was not shown of 
record.  Here, Felton’s address was shown of record so no additional 
inquiry was required.”230 
The mineral owner had argued that the result would be absurd because 
a surface owner with knowledge of the correct mailing address could 
intentionally send notice to an incorrect record address.231 The Court, 
however, did not accept this as a valid objection by stating:  
 
Rather, our judicial review in this case is limited to determining 
the law’s meaning according to the rules of construction . . . When 
those rules are applied here, there is not an absurd result because 
Felton would have received notice if she had kept her address of 
record current.232 
 
Applying these rules, therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the 
district court and ruled in favor of the surface owner, since he had mailed 
the notice to a record address, albeit not the correct current address, which 
was not of record.233  No inquiry was required to determine whether it was 
current or not.234  As will be seen below, this decision became a benchmark 
for further cases in which similar situations existed.  It could be argued that 
the Court misinterpreted the statutory language “if the address of the 
mineral interest owner is shown,” because in this case the actual address 
was not shown of record, since the address of record was not the actual 
address.  That is, if the statute was intended to mean the mineral owner’s 
current address at the time of the mailing of the notice of lapse, then the 
mailing by Sorenson was not made to Felton’s current address.  As 
described in this case, and in the cases discussed below, the “address of the 
                                                        
229. Id. ¶¶ 11-13, 793 N.W.2d at 802-03. 
230. Id. ¶ 14, 793 N.W.2d at 803. 
231. Id.  
232. Id. 
233. Sorenson, ¶ 17, 793 N.W.2d at 804. 
234. Id. ¶ 15, 793 N.W.2d at 802-03. 
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mineral owner” has come to mean whatever is the most recent recorded 
address, whether it is current or not, even if the mineral owner is 
deceased.235 
E. SORENSON V. ALINDER 
Sorenson v. Alindor is nearly an identical case to Sorenson v. Felton, 
even involving the same surface owner and the same time frames.236  The 
occurrences in question occurred in January 2007, and thus took place prior 
to the 2007 amendments, rendering them inapplicable.  This was also an 
appeal from a quiet title action brought by the surface owner, Sorenson, 
seeking to acquire the mineral interest owned of record by the successors of 
Ken Alinder and Edna Alinder.237  There had also been no use of the 
mineral interest for more than twenty years.238  The notice of lapse was 
published and Sorenson timely mailed the notice to Ken and Edna Alinder, 
the mineral owners of record who had acquired the mineral interest in 1953 
and who died in 1980 and 1999, respectively.239  The notice of lapse was 
timely mailed to their record address in 2007.240  No reasonable inquiry as 
to a current address had been made.241  The Court’s analysis is the same as 
in the Felton case, concluding that a reasonable inquiry is required only 
when the mineral owner’s address does not appear of record.242  
Accordingly, the Court’s holding was that the lower court had erred in 
requiring Sorenson to conduct a reasonable inquiry, so that the case was 
remanded in order for the district court to enter a quiet title judgment in 
favor of the surface owner, since a copy of the notice of lapse had been 
mailed to an address of record even though the mineral owners were 
                                                        
235. It was specifically clarified in Capps v. Weflen, 2014 ND 201, 855 N.W.2d 63 discussed 
infra, that the fact that the record owner of the mineral interest is deceased is not relevant to the 
question of the address of record. 
236. Sorenson v. Alinder, 2011 ND 36, 793 N.W.2d 797. 
237. Id. ¶ 3, 793 N.W.2d at 798. 
238. Id. ¶ 2 (“Because more than 50 years had passed without the Alinders having used the 
minerals, Sorenson published notice of the lapse in January 2007.”). 
239. Id. 
240. Id. 
241. Id. ¶ 3. 
242. Alinder, ¶ 6, 793 N.W.2d 799 stating:  
In Sorenson v. Felton . . . we construed N.D.C.C. § 38-18.1-06(2) and held this section 
requires a ‘reasonable inquiry’ only when the mineral owner’s address does not appear 
of record . . . [T]he district court erred in requiring Sorenson to also conduct a 
‘reasonable inquiry’ to establish compliance with N.D.C.C. § 38-18.1-06. 
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deceased.243  A further discussion concerning the validity of notices of lapse 
mailed to deceased persons is located below in the discussion of Capps v. 
Weflen. 
F. JOHNSON V. TALIAFERRO 
Johnson v. Taliaferro was also decided in 2011, but added a new 
element, namely the quiet title provisions that were part of the 2009 
amendments to the Act.244  As discussed above, a whole new section was 
added to the original Act, providing for “perfecting title in the surface 
owner” by means of a quiet title action.245  This is not mandatory in order to 
vest title in the surface owner, since title vests as of the date of 
abandonment if the surface owner has given the proper notice of lapse and 
the mineral owner has not filed a timely statement of claim to prevent such 
vesting of title.246 
It was apparently decided in 2009 that a specific quiet title action 
provision should be included, probably in order to have a recordable 
judgment as to the ownership.247  The source of the issue in Johnson v. 
Taliaferro was not the concept of a quiet title action in and of itself, but the 
fact that this new quiet title section requires a reasonable inquiry to be made 
by the surface owner.248  This is not contrary to the holdings in the two 
Sorenson cases of course because the 2009 amendments were not yet in 
effect in those cases.249  Those two cases were indeed quiet title actions, but 
they had been brought under the traditional quiet title action statute, which 
had been in effect long before 1983 and had no specific connection with 
mineral abandonment issues.250 
The mineral owner, Taliaferro, argued that his situation was different 
from those in the Sorenson cases, because his quiet title action was brought 
in 2010, after the new quiet title section had been added to the Act by the 
                                                        
243. The original owners, Russell Alinder and Edna Alinder, had died, respectively, in 1980 
and 1999. Id. ¶ 2, 793 N.W.2d at 798. 
244. Johnson v. Taliaferro, 2011 ND 34, 793 N.W.2d 804. 
245. 2009 N.D. Laws ch. 317 § 5 (N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-06.1 (West 2017)). 
246. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §38-18.1-02 (West 2017). 
247. 2009 N.D. Laws ch. 317 § 5. 
248. Id. § 5(2). 
249. See Sorenson v. Felton, 2011 ND 33, 793 N.W.2d 799. See also Sorenson v. Alinder, 
2011 ND 36, 793 N.W.2d 797. (The quiet title actions in both Sorenson v. Alinder and Sorenson v. 
Felton were commenced in 2008). 
250. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 32-17-01 (West 2017). 
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2009 amendments.251  Under this new section, the reasonable inquiry is a 
required element in order for the surface owner to win his case, but only if 
his case is a quiet title action under the 2009 amendment.252  Under the 
2009 amendment, the surface owner is required to submit evidence to the 
district court establishing that all required procedures under the Act were 
properly conducted and that a reasonable inquiry was made.253 Then 
judgment quieting title in the surface owner could be granted: 
 
If the district court finds that the surface owner has complied with 
all procedures of the chapter and has conducted a reasonable 
inquiry, the district court shall issue its findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and enter judgment perfecting title to the 
mineral interest in the owner or owners of the surface estate.254 
 
The factual background was similar in the Taliaferro case to the 
Sorenson cases, in that a notice of lapse had been mailed to an address of 
record of the mineral owner, but it was not received.255  Under the rulings in 
the two Sorenson cases, therefore, the required notice had been made by the 
mailing, and there was no requirement to make a reasonable inquiry, or any 
kind of inquiry, as to a current address.256  The Court rejected the mineral 
owner’s claim that the new 2009 quiet title section applied, because the title 
had already vested in the surface owner through the mailing of the notice 
and the fact that the mineral owner did not record a statement of claim.257  
The Court further stated that “We held in Sorenson v. Felton . . . that 
section 38-18.1-06 N.D.C.C. requires reasonable inquiry only when the 
mineral owner’s address does not appear of record.”258 
In response to the mineral owner’s argument that the 2009 amendments 
applied in his 2010 quiet title action, the Court pointed out that both before 
and after the 2009 amendments, the Abandoned Minerals Act provided that 
                                                        
251. 2009 N.D. Laws ch. 317 § 5. Johnson v. Taliaferro, 2011 ND 34, ¶ 10, 793 N.W.2d 804, 
806 (“Taliaferro argues section 38-18.1-06, N.D.C.C., requires a surface owner to conduct a 
reasonable inquiry to find a mineral owner’s current address, even when an address appears of 
record.”). 
252. See 2009 N.D. Laws ch. 317 § 5(2). 
253. Id. 
254. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-06.1(2) (West 2017). 
255. See Taliaferro, ¶ 5, 793 N.W.2d at 805. 
256. See Sorenson v. Felton, 2011 ND 33, 793 N.W.2d 799. see also Sorenson v. Alinder, 
2011 ND 36, 793 N.W.2d 797. 
257. Id.  
258. Taliaferro, ¶ 11, 793 N.W.2d. at 806. 
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title vests in the surface owner on the date of abandonment.259  Therefore, 
the reasonable inquiry requirement in the quiet title provisions in the 2009 
amendments could not operate to undo the vesting of title.260  The Court 
found that “The quiet title requirements in N.D.C.C. § 38-18.1-06(2) cannot 
be used to deprive the Johnsons of an interest in the minerals that has 
already vested under N.D.C.C. § 38-18.1-02. (2004).”261 
Bringing a quiet title action under this new section of the Act is not a 
requirement for the surface owner.262  The new 2009 quiet title statutory 
provisions state that the surface owner or owners “may maintain an action 
in district court.”263  In fact, it would seem simpler to being a quiet title 
action under N.D.C.C. ch. 32-17, which does not have any reference to a 
requirement for a reasonable inquiry.  In any case, now since the 2007 
amendments to the Act provide that the successful surface owner who 
succeeds to a mineral interest after a lapse is entitled to record a statement 
of succession in interest, there may be no strong motive at all in going 
through a quiet title action to obtain a recordable judgment.264  
The interaction of the 2009 quiet title action amendment and the 
automatic vesting of title when the requirements of mailing the notice of 
lapse have been satisfied, and no timely statement of claim has been 
recorded, creates an uncertainty set out in Chief Justice VandeWalle’s 
concurring opinion in the Taliaferro case, where the Chief Justice stated:  
 
But, I note our decision does not resolve the issue of whether or 
not, in light of the 2009 amendments to N.D.C.C. §38-18.1-
06.1(2), a quiet title action would lie or whether or not a severed 
mineral interest would even be considered abandoned under the 
provisions of N.D.C.C. 38-18.1-06 if the procedures under 38-
18.1-06 were begun after the 2009 amendments to §38-18.1-
06.1(2) became effective and no reasonable inquiry was 
conducted. I believe this is an open question that invites further 
legislative clarification or awaits a judicial determination.265 
                                                        
259. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-02 (West 2017). 
260. Id. 
261. Taliaferro, ¶ 17, 793 N.W.2d at 808. 
262. The title of this section is “Perfecting title in surface owner.” Title, however, vests 
without a quiet title judgment. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-18.1-02 (2017). 
263. 2009 N.D. Laws ch. 317 § 5(1), at 11. 
264. 2007 N.D. Laws ch. 313 § 2, at 1220 (codified as amended at N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 
38-18.1-02 (West 2017)). 
265. Taliaferro, ¶ 20, 793 N.W.2d at 808 (VandeWalle, C.J., concurring). 
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G. LARSON V. NORHEIM 
Larson v. Norheim266 is a minor case that simply deals with the 
question of proper execution of a statement of claim recorded under the 
Act.  A notice of lapse had been published and mailed to the mineral 
owners’ address of record, relating to several mineral interests.267  Within 
the sixty-day period following the first publication of the notice, the heirs of 
the record mineral owners recorded a statement of claim on June 27, 
2007.268  The only issue was whether the persons who signed the statement 
of claim were not the heirs, but rather persons who had agreed orally with 
the heirs to sign the document, which listed the names of the heirs of the 
deceased owners of the mineral interests.269  There was no written agency 
agreement for the signing of the statement by the non-heirs, which the 
Court did not find to be significant and held that the oral agreement was 
sufficient.270  This is completely consistent with the provision that goes 
back to the original 1983 Act, providing that the statement of claim must be 
recorded by the owner of the mineral interest or the owner’s representative 
and contain the names of the owners.271  This was the sole issue in this 
case.272 
H. PETERSON V. JASMANKA 
Peterson v. Jasmanka involved an attempt by a mineral owner to 
vacate a 1990 default judgment which had quieted title in the surface 
owners.273  They had complied with all the requirements of the Act, 
including the publication and mailing of the notice of lapse to the mineral 
owner’s most recent address of record.274  The current mineral owner, the 
successor to the original owner, Lester Jasmanka, who had died in 1963, 
moved in 2012 to vacate the default judgment twenty-two years after it had 
been entered.275  The alleged basis for the motion to vacate was based on 
the novel theory that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction to enter a 
judgment because there had had been improper service of the notice of 
                                                        
266. 2013 ND 60, 830 N.W.2d 85.  
267. Norheim, ¶ 3, 830 N.W.2d at 87. 
268. Id. ¶ 4.  
269. Id. ¶ 8, 830 N.W.2d at 88. 
270. Id. ¶ 13, 830 N.W.2d at 90. 
271. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-04(1) (West 2017). 
272. Norheim, ¶ 18, 830 N.W.2d at 91-92. 
273. 2014 ND 40, 842 N.W.2d 920.  
274. Id. ¶ 3, 842 N.W.2d at 922-23. 
275. Id. ¶ 5, 842 N.W.2d at 923. 
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lapse.276  The alleged improper service was apparently based on the claim 
that the notice had to be mailed to both of the two slightly different 
addresses for Jasmanka that appeared in the record.277  In fact there was no 
basis for this, as the notice had been mailed to the most recent record 
address.278  In any case, the Court did not need to address that issue, since it 
held that there was no personal jurisdiction issue under the Act:  
 
The statutory procedure is wholly self-executing, and once the 
notice procedure under the statute is completed, title to the mineral 
interest vests in the surface owner as of the date of abandonment, 
without the necessity of a subsequent quiet title action . . . We 
have drawn a clear distinction between the statutory abandoned 
minerals procedure under N.D.C.C. ch. 38-18.1 and a separate 
quiet title action, and have emphasized they are entirely separate, 
distinct procedures . . . Whether the surface owner complied with 
the statute, including the notice provisions, and thereby acquired 
title to the minerals is purely a substantive issue on the merits in 
the quiet title action and is not relevant to personal jurisdiction.279 
 
All of the cases discussed above have been quiet title actions, since 
there needs to be some kind of existing judgment to go before the North 
Dakota Supreme Court.  Presumably, these cases were based on the general 
quiet title action provisions in N.D.C.C. ch. 32-17, since the “perfecting 
title in surface owners” quiet title section (N.D.C.C. § 38-18.1-06.1) was 
only added to the statute by the 2009 amendments, discussed above.  The 
attempt to vacate the 1990 quiet title judgment based on a personal 
jurisdiction issue purportedly arising from the Act appears to have been a 
far-fetched notion.  There would have been no difference in the Court’s 
analysis if this case had fallen under the 2009 amendments.  The Court 
reiterated the statement it made in Halvorson v. Starr280 that the notice 
requirement under the Act “is not part of a civil action, or part of any 
procedure in the district court.”281 
                                                        
276. Id. ¶ 8, 842 N.W.2d at 924. 
277. Id. ¶ 20, 842 N.W.2d at 926. 
278. Id. ¶ 3, 842 N.W.2d at 923. 
279. Jasmanka, ¶¶ 12-14, 842 N.W.2d at 925. 
280. 2010 ND 133, 785 N.W.2d 248 (N.D. 2010). 
281. Jasmanka, ¶ 17, 842 N.W.2d at 926. 
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I. ESTATE OF CHRISTESON V. GILSTAD 
In Estate of Christeson v. Gilstad,282 the Court was presented with a 
slight change of topic from the previous cases that dealt with the questions 
of record addresses.  The question here was whether it was sufficient for the 
actual legal owner of the mineral interest to have executed a mineral lease 
or was it necessary that it be executed by the record owner, who was not the 
actual owner, in order to establish that there was a valid lease to constitute a 
“use” under the Act, so as to prevent the reversion of the mineral interest to 
the surface owner.283  The mineral interest in question was a one-eighth 
interest owned by Edyth Christeson.284  She died in 1983, leaving her 
husband Emmett as her sole heir.285  There was no administration of her 
estate, however, and therefore, there was no record owner except Edyth, 
although the interest had passed automatically upon her death to Emmett 
under the laws of succession.286  Her husband Emmett remarried, and he 
and his new wife Eleanor executed an oil and gas lease in 1989 which was 
recorded.287  
The surface owners (Gilstads) published a notice of lapse of mineral 
interest in 2007 and mailed copies to Edyth and Emmett, both then 
deceased, at their address of record.288  The surface owners did not contest 
Emmett’s ownership, but contended that only a lease signed by the record 
owner of the mineral interest could qualify as a “use.”289  The Court held in 
favor of Emmett’s successor as the actual mineral owner, whose interest 
was not of record, on the grounds that the statute did not require that the 
recorded lease needed to be executed by the actual record owner of the 
mineral interest.290  The record, of course. still showed Edyth as the 
owner.291  The Court found that it was sufficient that there was a lease of 
record within the twenty-year period by stating:  
 
Section 38-18.1-03(1)(d) does not on its face require that a lease 
be executed by a record owner to be deemed a use of the mineral 
                                                        
282. 2013 ND 50, 829 N.W.2d 453 (N.D. 2013). 
283. Christeson, ¶ 7, 829 N.W.2d at 455. 
284. Id. ¶ 2, 829 N.W.2d at 454. 
285. Id. ¶ 9, 829 N.W.2d at 455. 
286. Id. 
287. Id. 
288. Id. ¶ 4, 829 N.W.2d at 454. 
289. Christeson, ¶ 10, 829 N.W.2d at 456. 
290. Id. ¶ 16, 829 N.W.2d at 457. 
291. Id. ¶ 9, 829 N.W.2d at 455. 
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interest which will preclude a finding of abandonment under 
N.D.C.C. § 38-18.1-02 . . . Section 38-18.1-03(1)(d) N.D.C.C. 
does not require that the lease be executed by the owner of record, 
but merely provides that the recording of a lease of the mineral 
interest is deemed to be a use under N.D.C.C. ch. 38-18.1.292 
 
This certainly appears to be the appropriate result.  The statute simply 
states that a use is underway if a mineral interest on any tract is subject to a 
lease recorded in the county in which the mineral interest is located.293  
There would be no purpose in rejecting the lease, which was a valid use of 
the mineral interest, simply because it had been signed by an actual owner 
other than by the deceased record owner.  It is not particularly unusual, as is 
apparent in title searching in rural North Dakota, for there to have been no 
administration of an estate.  The heirs simply succeed to the deceased’s 
interests based on the statutory succession rules.294 
J. CAPPS V. WEFLEN 
Later in the same year in which Peterson v. Jasmanka was decided, the 
North Dakota Supreme Court issued an opinion in Capps v. Weflen.295  This 
case came to the rather startling conclusion that even if the record owners 
were deceased and the surface owners were aware of that fact, the mailing 
of the copy of the notice of lapse to the last record address of the owners 
was sufficient to satisfy the statute.296  This appears to be quite a futile 
process.  The court action, like the other cases above, was a quiet title 
proceeding brought by the Capps who owned a mineral interest that was 
either one-fourth or one-half, depending on the construction of a deed.297  
The Weflens already owned a one-half mineral interest in the tract in 
question, conveyed to them by the previous owner of one-hundred percent 
of the mineral interest (Ruth Nelson).298 
The issue between the Capps and the Weflens was not so much based 
on the abandoned minerals concept, as it was on the question whether a 
                                                        
292. Id. ¶¶ 12, 15, 829 N.W.2d at 456-57. 
293. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-03(1)(d) (West 2017). 
294. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 30.1-04-01 (West 2017) (“Any part of a decedent’s estate not 
effectively disposed of by will passes by intestate succession to the decedent’s heirs as prescribed 
in this title, except as modified by decedent’s will.”). 
295. 2014 ND 201, 855 N.W.2d 637. 
296. Capps, ¶ 10, 855 N.W.2d at 643. 
297. Id. ¶ 4, 855 N.W.2d at 641. 
298. Id. ¶ 2, 855 N.W.2d at 640. 
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deed from Nelson had conveyed only a 1/4 or a whole 1/2 mineral interest 
to Capps.299  The abandoned minerals issue came into play because if the 
interest conveyed was a whole 1/2, then the heirs of Nelson had nothing left 
and there was nothing the Weflens could acquire from them under an 
abandoned mineral procedure.300  If, on the other hand, Capps had acquired 
only a 1/4 mineral interest, then the Nelson heirs owned 1/4 and this was 
the interest sought by the Weflens under the abandoned minerals 
procedure.301  Accordingly, the surface owners carried out the required 
three-week publication of the notice of lapse and mailed copies of the notice 
to both of the last known addresses of the mineral owner.302  The record 
contained a mailing address for Ruth Nelson, but apparently no evidence of 
the fact that she was deceased, who her successors were, or who the owners 
of either the 1/2 or the 1/4 mineral interest were.303  The district court ruled 
that the surface owners had not complied with the notice requirement, 
because they were aware that the Weflens knew of the death of Ruth 
Nelson, so that the mailing of the notice would have been ineffective.304 
It could probably have been argued then that their deaths resulted in the 
mailing of notice having no effect and that they would need to make a 
reasonable inquiry instead, but this argument was apparently not made.  In 
any case, this would not have prevailed, in view of the Court’s holding in 
the Taliaferro case.  The district court in Capps had stated that mailing 
notice to a dead person was “absurd.”305  The Supreme Court, however, 
stated that “because the abandoned mineral statutes are in derogation of the 
common law, courts ‘must review for strict construction and application of 
statutory requirements,’”306 citing its opinion in the Spring Creek case.  In 
other words, specific statutory rules which are not consistent with common 
law tradition must be very strictly construed.  The Weflens had mailed the 
notice of lapse to Nelson’s record address, in fact two separate address for 
her on record, and this was consistent with the clear language of the statute: 
 
                                                        
299. Id. ¶ 4, 855 N.W.2d at 641. 
300. Id. 
301. Id. 
302. Capps, ¶ 3, 855 N.W.2d at 640. 
303. Id. 
304. Id. ¶ 4, 855 N.W.2d at 641-42. 
305. Id. ¶ 9, 855 N.W.2d at 642. 
306. Id. See supra the earlier discussion in this article as to the common law regarding 
abandonment of real property. 
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First, whether the Weflens had actual knowledge of Nelson’s death 
at the time of mailing is disputed, but this not a material fact . . . 
Here the Weflens attempted to notify Nelson by mail through two 
of her addresses that were ‘of record’ . . . In Alinder307 . . . this 
Court made it clear than when the mineral interest owners of 
record are deceased, the notice must still be mailed to the address 
of the deceased owners of record . . . We conclude a surface owner 
is required to conduct a reasonable inquiry only if the mineral 
owner’s address does not appear of record, even if the surface 
owner knows the mineral owner whose address appears of record 
is deceased.308 
 
In addition to the reference back to the Alinder case, the Court also 
mentioned that in that case it had relied upon its decisions in the Felton and 
Taliaferro cases.309  The application of the mailing requirement of notices 
to deceased owners, however was not quite so emphasized in those cases as 
in Capps.310  The clear holding that mailing a notice of lapse to a deceased 
person is sufficient is conceptually a rather bizarre notion, since it is clear 
that the deceased person will not be able read the notice.  It may be, of 
course, that the heirs or successors of the deceased might be living at the 
same address, so that the notice would come to their attention, but this is 
purely speculative.  The Court’s analysis, however, is sound only in that it 
follows the literal and explicit language of the statute, which is “address of 
record,” as opposed to something like “address at which the intended 
recipient is living.”  
A logical solution to this problem might be to amend the statute again, 
so that if the record mineral owner is known by the surface owner to be 
deceased a reasonable inquiry must be required, just as though there had 
                                                        
307. See Alinder, 2011 ND 36, ¶ 6, 793 N.W.2d 797. 
308. Capps, ¶¶ 10-13, 855 N.W.2d at 642-44. 
309. See Sorenson v. Felton, 2011 ND 33, 793 N.W.2d 799. See also Sorenson v. Alinder, 
2011 ND 36, 793 N.W.2d 797. 
310. Capps, ¶¶ 10-12, 855 N.W.2d at 642-44 stating:  
This Court in Alinder . . . relied upon Felton and Taliaferro in ruling no reasonable 
inquiry was required where the surface owner mailed the notice of lapse to the mineral 
owners’ address of record in 2007, even though the mineral interest owners had died 
in 1980 and 1999, respectively . . . Alinder reinforces our conclusion in Felton that the 
address of record need not be the mineral interest owner’s correct address for the 
mailing of the notice of lapse to satisfy the statutory requirement . . . Because the 
possibility of death is not confined to the elderly, a surface owner could not be certain 
whether the mineral owner of record was deceased. The surface owner would be 
required to make a ‘reasonable inquiry’ in every case. . . .  
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been no addresses of record.  This could, of course, generate a new problem 
if surface owners who actually knew of the death of the mineral owner of 
record might claim, to avoid the reasonable inquiry requirement, that they 
had no such knowledge.  In any case, in this particular instance, the Court 
held in favor of the surface owners, on the grounds that the notice to the 
deceased mineral owners was sufficient to meet the statutory 
requirement.311  Even though the Court’s analysis could possibly be said to 
be arguably correct, as based on a very strict reading of the statute, this 
express holding by the Court in Capps has attained a certain notoriety in the 
legal community. 
K. YESEL V. BRANDON 
Yesel v. Brandon is a somewhat peculiar case, injecting the question of 
whether the Termination of Mineral Interest statutes covers royalty interests 
as well as mineral interests.312  A royalty interest is, of course, in a sense, a 
piece of a mineral interest.  It is an interest carved out of a mineral interest 
which gives the owner a percentage return on oil and gas (or other minerals) 
when produced and saved.313  For example, A may have purchased a 5% 
royalty interest in B’s 100% (or lesser) mineral interest in a tract.  Then 
suppose the mineral owner leases his interest and the lessee then uses the 
mineral interest in the most obvious manner among the various categories 
of “use” listed in the Act, that is by developing and producing the minerals.  
The royalty owner is, of course, entitled to 5% of the produced minerals, 
without having had to provide any of the costs of exploration, development 
and production.  The mineral interest is actually being used in several ways: 
minerals are produced, operations are being conducted and the mineral 
interest is subject to a lease.314 
Then suppose that the mineral interest is not being be used in any of the 
ways described in the statute.  The surface owner, as in all the cases 
described above, can then publish and mail a notice of lapse to try to 
acquire the mineral owner’s interest.  Does the Act allow the surface owner 
to also acquire the outstanding 5% royalty interest owned by A?  When the 
surface owner has successfully acquired the abandoned mineral interest, 
however, that interest is burdened with the outstanding royalty interest, 
                                                        
311. Id. ¶ 13, 855 N.W.2d at 644. 
312. 2015 ND 195, 867 N.W.2d 677. 
313. 1 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 202.3, 25-26 
(2016). 
314. See N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-03(1) (West 2017). 
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since it existed separately from the mineral interest.315  There would be no 
basis upon which the surface owner could have acquired something that 
was not part of the abandoned mineral interest.  A royalty owner has no 
power to do anything with the interest he acquired, except sell it to someone 
else, since a royalty owner has no power to explore, develop or produce any 
minerals.316  He or she simply must wait for minerals to be produced and 
saved before receiving anything.  A royalty owner is sometimes described 
as owning a “non-participating royalty” interest, as the Court does in the 
Yesel case.317 
In this case the surface owner, brought a quiet title action against the 
royalty owners, claiming the interests had been abandoned by nonuse.318  
The response from the royalty owners was, of course, that the royalty 
interests which were related to the mineral interest could not have been 
abandoned because the tract had been under lease within the previous 
twenty years and was subject to a pooling order and there was a producing 
well within the pooled area.319  The surface owner argued that the list of 
“uses” under the abandoned mineral statutes did not apply to royalty 
interests.320  This was a fairly feeble argument, and the Court held that it 
was unnecessary to make that specific decision because the relationship 
between the mineral interest and the royalty interest from which it came 
meant that if the mineral interest was being used the royalty interest 
necessarily was also being used: 
 
As discussed above, an owner of a royalty interest cannot develop 
or produce the minerals related to the royalty interest. A royalty 
owner receives a share of the proceeds from the production of the 
minerals. Therefore, we conclude royalty interest cannot be 
considered abandoned if the related mineral interest is being used 
under N.D.C.C. § 38-18.1-03(1), and find it unnecessary in this 
case to address whether the abandoned mineral statutes contained 
in N.D.C.C. ch. 38-18.1 apply to royalty interests. To the extent 
                                                        
315. No change in ownership of a mineral interest can change the fact that the mineral 
interest may be burdened with a prior existing royalty interest. Accordingly, since that is the case, 
an abandoned mineral interest which passes to the surface owner will continue to be burdened by 
the royalty interest. 
316. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 313, at 26. 
317. See Yesel, ¶ 2, 867 N.W.2d at 679. 
318. Id. ¶ 3. 
319. Id. ¶ 4. 
320. Id. ¶ 8, 867 N.W.2d at 680. 
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N.D.C.C. ch. 38-18.1 may apply to royalty interests, we conclude 
a royalty interest is used if the related mineral interest is used 
under N.D.C.C. § 38-18.1-03(1).321 
 
Accordingly, the Court held in favor of the royalty owners.322  The 
decision in this case is surely correct, and it seems unlikely that any future 
case will raise this issue again.  It simply makes no sense to attempt to sever 
the royalty estate from the mineral estate from which it exists.  A royalty 
interest does not exist independently from the mineral interest from which it 
was carved, since the royalty interest is only meaningful or valuable to the 
extent the mineral interest is meaningful or valuable.  Only when a mineral 
interest has been developed and minerals are actually produced from the 
development does a related royalty interest have any value or significance.  
A royalty interest cannot, therefore, be treated as an independent entity for 
purposes of determining there has been an abandonment under the statute. 
L. NELSON V. MCALESTER FUEL CO. 
It probably could be claimed that Nelson v. McAlester Fuel Co. is 
“more of the same,” and it is true that the circumstances are similar to 
several of the cases discussed above, but the Court’ emphasis is somewhat 
different in this recent case.323  As usual, the issue does not center around 
the question of whether the mineral owner was at fault for failure to file a 
timely statement of claim.  The critical issue, as usual, was whether the 
surface owner seeking to acquire the mineral interest gave the statutorily 
required notice of lapse.324  That question does, of course, underlie the 
matter of recording a statement of claim as well, because if the notice was 
not effective, then the mineral owner was not required to file a statement of 
claim to protect his interest.325 
Nelson, the surface owner, published a typical notice of lapse for three 
consecutive weeks and then mailed a copy of the notice to P.O. Box 210 in 
Magnolia, Arkansas, which was the mineral owner’s address on a 1958 oil 
and gas lease.326  A 1968 oil and gas lease, however, bore the address of 
                                                        
321. Id. ¶ 13, 867 N.W.2d at 682. 
322. Id.  
323. 2017 ND 49, 891 N.W.2d 126. 
324. Nelson, ¶ 11, 891 N.W.2d at 130. 
325. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.§ 38-18.1-06(2) (West 2017). 
326. Nelson, ¶ 2, 891 N.W.2d at 128. The Court’s opinion refers to this as a “notice of 
claim,” but it was clearly intended to mean a notice of lapse mailed by the surface owner. 
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P.O. Box 10 in Magnolia.327  The district court ruled against the surface 
owner, on the basis that he had mailed the notice of lapse to the 1958 
address rather than the more recent 1968 address.328  As opposed to the 
Capps case scenario, where the notice of lapse was mailed to both of the 
addresses of record, in this case the notice was mailed only to Box 10, the 
1958 address.329  This was fatal to Nelson’s attempt to secure the mineral 
interest: 
 
In this case, the record reflects the existence of two different 
addresses of record. Nelson sent notice of lapse to the older record 
address appearing on the 1958 mineral deed. The record shows 
Nelson was aware of the more recent document containing the 
most recent address of record . . . Here, the issue is whether a 
surface owner seeking to claim abandoned mineral interests 
complies with the statute by mailing notice to a single address of 
record when a newer address of record is known to the surface 
owner. We cannot say Nelson complied with the statute by mailing 
notice of lapse to the older of the two addresses.330 
 
Although the statute itself does not expressly specify that it is the most 
recent address that is the one that must be used, common sense and the 
precise language of the statute confirm that is the case.  If any address of 
record were allowed to be used, there might be a tendency for surface 
owners to select the oldest address of record in the hope that the record 
owner could no longer be located or was deceased.  As the Court stated, 
“the address” must mean the most recent one: 
 
To broadly interpret the phrase “the address of the mineral interest 
owner … shown of record” to mean any address shown of record 
would render meaningless the legislature’s use of “the” before 
“address of the mineral interest owner.” . . . As a result, we 
interpret this phrase in the statute to indicate a surface owner must 
send notice to the most recent address of record in order to comply 
with N.D.C.C. §38-18.1-06(2) (2004).331 
                                                        
327. Id. 
328. Id. ¶ 17, 891 N.W.2d at 132. 
329. Id. ¶ 16, 891 N.W.2d at 132. 
330. Id. ¶ 16, 891 N.W.2d at 132. 
        331. Id. ¶ 18, 891 N.W.2d at 132-33. 
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In this case, Nelson failed to do so.  As a result, the district court 
properly concluded Nelson failed to satisfy the notice requirements of the 
statute, and therefore the mineral interest never vested in Nelson and 
remained with McAlester.332  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district 
court’s decision in favor of the mineral owner.333 
M. HUEBNER V. FURLINGER 
Huebner v. Furlinger334 deals, as most of the other cases do, with an 
issue pertaining to the notice of lapse. As with all of the other cases, as 
well, the appeal to the Supreme Court arises from a quiet title action in the 
district court.335  The surface owners published their notice of lapse, as 
required, and mailed a copy of the notice to the mineral owner at her record 
address in Florida.336  The address was taken from a 1982 personal 
representative’s deed, but one variation was made, which was to 
supplement the address with a zip code, absent from the deed.337 The 
mineral interest in question was a one-fourth interest, owned one-eighth by 
Elsie Furlinger and one-eighth by her sister Janet Hill.338 The interest of 
Janel Hill had been ruled by the district court to not have passed to the 
surface owners because they had not sent a notice of lapse to her recorded 
address.339 This was approved by the North Dakota Supreme Court, so that 
the Court’s opinion, primarily applied to the Furlinger interest.340   
The Court points out that the 2009 and 2007 amendments did not affect 
this case, since the notice of lapse was dated in 2006.341  This was 
presumably noted because the 2009 amendment, as discussed above, added 
to the statute the new section entitled “perfecting title in surface owner,” 
under which a surface owner can obtain a judgment establishing ownership 
of the mineral interest, but does specify that a reasonable inquiry must be 
conducted.342  As pointed out above, this section creates a curious anomaly, 
as it would appear to be possible to bring the quiet title action under 
                                                        
332. Id.  
333. Nelson, ¶ 26, 891 N.W.2d at 135. 
334. 2017 ND 145, 896 N.W.2d 258. 
335. Huebner, ¶ 1, 896 N.W.2d at 259. 
336. Id. ¶ 6, 896 N.W.2d at 260. 
337. Id. 
       338.  Id. ¶ 7.  
       339.  Id. ¶ 6.  
       340.  Huebner, ¶ 10, 896 N.W.2d at 261. 
341. Id. ¶ 9, N.W.2d at 261. 
342. 2009 N.D. Laws ch. 317, § 5 (codified at N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 38-18.1-06.1(2) 
(West 2017)). 
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N.D.C.C. ch. 32-17, which would not require a reasonable inquiry.343  In 
most of the cases discussed above, a quiet title action was brought, based on 
the traditional quiet title action statutes, because they were brought earlier 
than the effective date of the 2009 amendment which created the new quiet 
title procedure for abandoned mineral cases.  A confusing situation had 
arisen due to the two different quiet title statutes.  This was summarized in a 
2010 law review article:  
 
Under the 2009 amendments, the option of whether to bring a 
quiet title action appears to remain discretionary, as it did prior to 
the 2009 amendments in which the mineral owner had the option 
of bringing a quiet title action pursuant to chapter 32-17 of the 
North Dakota Century Code . . . However, potential confusion has 
arisen with the addition of the provision specifically providing for 
a quiet title action . . . Prior to the adoption of section 38-18.1-
06.1, surface owners commenced quiet title actions pursuant to 
chapter 32-17. There is no indication that section 38-18.1-06.1 was 
meant to usurp the method for quieting title prior to the 2009 
amendments; indeed the statute indicates whether a person brings a 
quiet title action at all is optional. 344 
 
 The central issue in Huebner was of course not the quiet title action 
confusion but rather the mailing address.345  The Court points out in its 
opinion, that the problem was the different zip codes in the two 
addresses.346  The dates of the two recorded documents, were not far 
apart.347  The opinion states that the oil and gas lease was signed on 
February 22, 1982.348  The personal representative’s deed was also dated in 
1982, though the opinion does not supply the actual date.349  In any case the 
Court labels the deed as the most recent document.350  The crux of the 
analysis was that this deed did not include a zip code: 
 
                                                        
343. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. ch. 32-17 (West 2017). 
344. Sara K. Sorenson, A Need for Clarification: North Dakota’s Abandoned Mineral 
Statute, 86 N.D. L. REV. 521, 532-34 (2010). 
345. Huebner, ¶ 9, 896 N.W.2d at 261. 
346. Id. ¶ 11, 896 N.W.2d at 261. 
347. Id. ¶ 3, 896 N.W.2d at 260. 
348. Id. 
349. Id. 
350. Id. ¶ 20, 896 N.W.2d at 263. 
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Here, the 1982 personal representative’s deed is the most recent 
address of record. However, it does not include a zip code. The 
issue in this case is whether a surface owner complies with the 
notice requirements of N.D.C.C. §38-18.1-06(2) by supplementing 
an address of record with a zip code.351 
 
The relevant statutory provision states the requirement of the 
publication of a notice of lapse for three successive weeks and then reads 
“however, if the address of the mineral interest owner is shown of record,” 
and then continues with the requirement of mailing a copy of the notice.352  
The Court follows the exact language in the statute:  “We interpret the 
phrase ‘shown of record’ to require the surface owner to send notice to the 
address as it appears (emphasis added) in the recorded document.”353 
Since the address on the recorded personal representative’s deed, which 
did not contain a zip code, is the most recent address, the insertion by the 
surface owner of a zip code in the mailed notice of lapse altered the address 
so that it was no longer the address “as shown of record:” 
 
By not mailing notice to the address, as it appears in the record, 
the mailing requirements of N.D.C.C. § 38-18.1-062 (2006) were 
not complied with. This analysis is supported by our conclusion in 
Capps v. Weflen . . . that the address of record need not be the 
mineral owner’s correct address for the mailing of the notice of 
lapse to satisfy the statutory requirement.354 
 
It is interesting that the Court was not actually so much concerned as to 
whether the inserted zip code was correct, which it apparently was not, but 
rather that a zip code was inserted at all, thereby changing the address of 
record.  The result in the case would probably have been the same if the 
issue had been whether the zip code was correct, as it apparently was not, 
since it was differed from the zip code that appeared in the address of the 
recorded oil and gas lease. 
                                                        
351. Huebner, ¶ 20, 896 N.W.2d at 263-64.  
352. N.D. CENT. CODE. § 38-18.1-06(2) (2017). 
353. Huebner, ¶ 21, 896 N.W.2d at 264. 
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N. SORENSON V. BAKKEN INVESTMENTS, LLC 
Sorenson v. Bakken Investments, LLC355 does not actually deal directly 
with the Termination of Mineral Interests Act and is mentioned here only 
because the Act is referenced in the opinion.  The actual issue was a 
question of collateral estoppel concerning an attempt to vacate a judgment 
that had been entered in a quiet title action based on a claim made under the 
Act.356  It is not clear from the opinion whether the quiet title action in 
question was brought under the “perfecting title in surface owner” 
provisions in the new quiet title action statute in 2009,357 which is possible 
since the action was commenced in 2010, after the 2009 amendments were 
in effect.  The Court does, however, quote from the long-established North 
Dakota quiet title provisions in N.D.C.C. 32-17-01.358  It seems likely, 
therefore that the action was brought under the original quiet title action 
provisions in Chapter 32-17 rather than under the more recent provisions in 
the 2009 amendments. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
As reflected in the discussion above, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
has established a fairly strict standard to be met with respect to the mailing 
of the notice of lapse, by any surface owner who seeks to acquire an 
“abandoned mineral interest” on his or her land.  It is interesting that nearly 
all of the cases with which the Court has dealt in connection with this 
statute revolve around the surface owner’s notice of lapse provisions.  This 
is logical since, apart from statements of claim that have been recorded in 
advance of receipt of a notice of lapse, those notices are the initial stimulus 
for the recording of claims by the mineral owners. 
There do not seem to be any issues that arise through any kind of 
successful challenge by a surface owner as to whether the record mineral 
owner has correctly met the requirements for the recording of a statement of 
claim.  Presumably, a statement of claim that contains a serious defect 
                                                        
355. 2017 ND 127, 895 N.W.2d 302. 
356. Bakken Invs., ¶ 1, 895 N.W.2d at 304. 
357. N.D. CENT. CODE. § 38-18.1-06.1 (2017). 
358. N.D. CENT. CODE. ch. 32-17 (2017) stating:  
An action may be maintained by any person having an estate or an interest in, or lien 
or encumbrance upon, real property, whether in or out of possession thereof and 
whether such property is vacant or unoccupied, against any person claiming an estate 
or interest in, or lien or encumbrance upon, the same, for the purpose of determining 
such adverse estate, interest, lien, or encumbrances. 
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would defeat the mineral owner’s claim and would therefore allow the 
surface owner to acquire the mineral interest. 
It is possible, of course, that the Court might be more lenient in a case 
involving the validity of the recorded statement of claim, on the grounds 
that any kind of recorded statement referencing the record mineral owner’s 
interest would be sufficient to demonstrate that the mineral interest had not 
been abandoned, thus defeating the surface owner’s attempt to acquire it.  
The statutes are a little confusing, in providing that the statement of claim 
must be filed prior to the end of the twenty-year period and then also 
providing that failure to file will not cause the mineral interest to be 
“extinguished,” if the statement of claim or documentation that any of the 
statutory “uses” has occurred, is filed within sixty days after the first 
publication of the notice of lapse.359  In any case, it is clear that there is a 
sixty-day period after the first publication of notice, and this would usually 
be the time in which the statement of claim, containing the name and 
address of the mineral owner, as well as the legal description of the land 
and the type of mineral, would be recorded, since it would be done in 
response to the notice.360  For example, under the requirement to state the 
type of mineral requirement, suppose that the mineral owner, without 
consulting an attorney or reading the statute, simply lists “all minerals.”  
Perhaps this is far-fetched, but would this statement cover any minerals at 
all if they were not specifically listed?  In all of the cases discussed above, it 
appears that oil and gas is the mineral type in question, but would they be 
included if not listed as “oil and gas,” or perhaps “hydrocarbons”?  In order 
to reach the question of the validity of the statement of claim, of course, it 
would be necessary first for the surface owner to properly mail a copy of 
the notice of the lapse.361  This is a significant hurdle for the surface owner, 
as demonstrated by the cases discussed above.362 
All in all, the North Dakota Termination of Mineral Interests Act 
reflects a valid legislative goal.  The purpose of this statute, and the statutes 
of the other states which have been enacted to deal with this issue is a 
laudable one:  Dormant mineral statutes were enacted in many states to 
                                                        
359. N.D. CENT. CODE. § 38-18.1-05 (2017). 
360. N.D. CENT. CODE. § 38-18.1-06 (2017). 
361. Id.  
362. Under the Common Law tradition, of course, a plaintiff was required to plead the 
strength of his own case rather than to focus on any weakness in his opponent’s case. 
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address the problem of fractionalized and unproductive mineral interests 
interfering with the development of mineral or surface estates.363 
 The intent of the North Dakota statute, as evidenced in the original 
North Dakota Legislature hearings on this issue was to provide a 
mechanism for eliminating old “unused” mineral and royalty interests from 
the record so as to simplify leasing of minerals and eliminate title problems 
arising from unlocatable heirs and successors by allowing for a procedure 
under which the mineral or royalty interest passes to the current surface 
owner.  
While the implementation of this goal has probably been to some 
degree accomplished, it has required a significant amount of litigation, 
reflected in the North Dakota Supreme Court decisions discussed above.  It 
has also led, in at least one instance to inconsistent statutory provisions, 
such as the conflict between the classical quiet title action described in 
N.D.C.C. ch. 32-17 and the specific quiet title action procedure that was 
attached to the Act in 2009.  The traditional quiet tile action contains no 
requirement for a reasonable inquiry to locate the address of the mineral 
owner.  On the other hand, the Court’s decisions have firmly established 
that no reasonable inquiry is necessary if there is an address of record, 
whereas the 2009 quiet title action provisions require a reasonable inquiry 
to be conducted.364  It is difficult to resolve this requirement with the 
statement in the same 2009 amendment stating that such a quiet title action 
would be essentially the same as one conducted under the traditional 
statute:  “This action must be brought in the same manner and is subject to 
the same procedure as an action to quiet title pursuant to chapter 32-17.”365 
Based on the dates involved in most, and probably in all, of the North 
Supreme Court cases discussed above, the plaintiffs must have brought their 
quiet title actions under Chapter 32-17.  Several could have been brought 
after the 2009 amendment took effect, but this is unlikely since there is no 
indication in the opinions that a reasonable inquiry had been conducted.  On 
the whole, the North Dakota Termination of Minerals Act has met some of 
the desired goals, but there are flaws that should be addressed, particularly 
the conflicting quiet title action provisions and perhaps an overly strict 
reading of the statutes that allows a notice of lapse mailed to a known 
deceased record mineral owner to satisfy the requirement.  
                                                        
363. Janna A. Aginsky & Frank Erisman, Dormant no More: Fracking Boom Causes States 
to Revisit Dormant Mineral Statutes; (A.B.A., Section of Environment, Energy and Resources, 
Mining and Mineral Extraction Committee Newsletter) Aug. 31, 2015, at 1. 
364. N.D. CENT. CODE. § 30-18.1-06.1(2) (2017). 
365. N.D. CENT. CODE. § 30-18.1-06.1(1) (2017). 
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An inherent element, of course, in any of the abandoned minerals 
statutes enacted by North Dakota and various other states is the inevitability 
of contention between the surface owner and the mineral owner, as the 
surface owner seeks to acquire the mineral interest and the mineral owner 
seeks to retain it.  The mineral owner presumably views the surface owner 
as a thief or a kind of poacher, seeking to acquire something for nothing, 
while the surface owner views an unused mineral interest as a barrier to the 
development of mineral resources.  The logical argument from the surface 
owner’s point of view would be that since the mineral owner has not used 
the interest for at least 20 years, there is likely to be no use of in the future 
unless ownership passes to the surface owner.  The mineral owner’s 
argument would be that the mere fact of failure to use a specific interest for 
twenty years could have a number of reasons, depending on preoccupation 
with other tracts owned, location of areas where the bulk of mineral activity 
was underway, lack of present funds to develop the mineral interests in a 
timely manner, etc.  Clearly there is no ultimate solution that could satisfy 
both sides of the dispute, but, with some changes, as discussed above, 
perhaps an accommodation could be reached.  In any case, it can be agreed 
that mineral interests are not being terminated or extinguished by becoming 
reunited with the overlying surface interest.  
The internal tension between protecting individual property rights 
while encouraging economic activity that is at the heart of the dormant 
mineral statutes is still evident in every court decision interpreting these 
statutes, and providing procedural clarity and consistency in the application 
of these statutes may be the only way to ease it.366 
One progressive step forward, for example, was the 2009 North Dakota 
amendment specifying the steps that must be taken to constitute a 
reasonable inquiry.  Although the existing North Dakota Supreme Court 
cases do not deal with any instances where this statutory provision came 
into play, it may likely prove useful in future situations.367 
VIII. FINAL THOUGHTS 
A final thought which might come to mind after the above discussion 
of the “abandoned minerals” issue in North Dakota, is whether the 
Marketable Record Title Act might be an alternative approach to the 
question. Under that Act, any person who holds an unbroken chain of title 
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367. See Gregory D. Russell and Lauren N. Fromme, Dormant Minerals Acts: Addressing 
Severed Mineral Interests in a Fractional World, 33 ENERGY & MIN. L. INST. 8, 295 (2012). 
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to an interest in real property “under a conveyance or other title transaction 
that has been of record for a period of twenty years or longer, and is in 
possession of the interest is deemed to have a marketable record title to the 
interest.”368  It might seem that this could establish the ownership by the 
record mineral owner without the necessity of the filing of the statement of 
claim required under the Termination of Mineral Interest Act to avoid the 
surface owner’s attempt to acquire the mineral interest, as discussed at 
length above.  The question would be whether the person seeking to rely 
upon the Marketable Record Title Act is actually in “possession” of the 
mineral interest.”  This is answered by a statutory link made between these 
two Acts created by a 2013 legislative amendment to the Marketable 
Record Title Act: 
 
The holder of an interest in severed minerals is deemed in 
possession of the minerals if that person has used the minerals as 
defined in section 38-18.1-03 and the use is stated in the affidavit 
of possession provided for in this section.369 
 
In other words, it appears that the owner of the mineral interest 
would be able, by filing such an affidavit of possession under the 
Marketable Record Title Act, to accomplish essentially the same 
thing as if he or she had filed a statement of claim under the 
Termination of Mineral Interest Act.   
It has also been suggested that the North Dakota adverse possession 
statute370 could have some impact in these kinds of situations.  The adverse 
possession criteria, however, do not fit in this context, as pointed out in a 
1994 law review article on mineral ownership: 
 
If the mineral estate is successfully severed from the surface by 
one who has the ability to do so, then acts performed with respect 
to the surface no longer have any possessory significance with 
respect to the now separate mineral estate. It can now be regarded 
as a separate, but buried tract of land; if the law of adverse 
                                                        
368. N.D. CENT CODE 47-19.1-01 (2017). 
369. Id. § 47-19.1-07; § 38-18.1-03 (2017) is, of course, the section of the Termination of 
Mineral Interest which defines what is meant by “use.” 
370. Id. § 47-06-03. 
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possession is to operate with respect to it, the basis must be an 
actual possession of the minerals themselves . . .  
The doctrine of adverse possession as applied by the common law 
to the mineral estate provides a means of terminating the mineral 
estate due to extended nonuse only when the mineral estate is 
severed after the period of possession begins.371 
 
This description of the apparent inability of the adverse possession 
doctrine to be available or helpful in the context of the acquisition of title to 
severed mineral interests by a surface owner is confirmed in a recent 
decision by the North Dakota Supreme Court in Black Stone Minerals Co. 
v. Brokaw.372 
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